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Hartzler: Reverse Age Discrimination Under the Age Discrimination in Employ

REVERSE AGE DISCRIMINATION UNDER
THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT: PROTECTING ALL
MEMBERS OF THE PROTECTED CLASS*
Company C, an advertising agency with sixty employees, is publicly
criticized for lacking diversity in personnel because all employees are
between the ages of twenty-two and thirty-five. When C gains a new
account with Second Spring, a manufacturer of arthritis medications, it
creates a new position to handle the workload. Applicants A and B, both
with twenty years advertising experience, apply for the position. A is
forty years old and B is fifty. While C thinks both A and B will do an
excellent job, C selects B because B is older. C believes that B's age will
help company image by creating diversity and that B will better
understand the interests of an older audience because B is older.
Company X likes to use older workers as "greeters" in visible positions
within its stores to promote X as a "community place." To foster this
image, X only promotes interested retirement-age employees to greeter
positions at X's stores. D, age fifty-five, and E, age sixty-five, have both
worked for X since the company's inception. Both D and E would like to
reduce their work responsibilities in preparation for retirement, and so
both apply for a greeter position when it becomes available. X chooses E
over D for the position because E's advanced age best serves the X
image.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Age discrimination in the workplace is predominantly perceived as
an older person losing a job opportunity to a younger person. 2
Opponents of these adverse employment decisions criticize employers

Prior to the publication of this Note, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear
Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002). At press time, the Court
had not yet issued an opinion on Cline.
I
The hypotheticals presented are the product of the author's imagination and are not
based on actual cases in whole or in part.
2
See, e.g., THE BUREAU OF NATL AFFAIRS, INC., OLDER AMERICANS IN THE WORKFORCE:
*

CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 123-45 (1987); RAYMOND F. GREGORY, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE: OLD AT A YOUNG AGE (2001); Barry Bennett Kaufman,

PreferentialHiring Policiesfor Older Workers Under the Age Discriminationin Employment Act,
56 S. CAL. L. REV. 825 (1983).
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for acting based on a stereotype of older workers. 3 For example, an
employer might view the older worker as less trainable, less efficient, or
more costly to employ than a relatively younger worker. 4 However, age
Common
discrimination in the workplace takes many forms. 5
discriminatory practices range from the explicit age-based hiring or
firing to the more subtle reduction in force that gradually phases older
employees out of the workforce. 6 Age discrimination also includes the
purely age-based decisions described in the hypotheticals above, in
which an older hiree or employee is favored specifically to benefit
company image or because of a stereotype that older people can best
serve older people.
7
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") in 1967 specifically to protect employees from adverse
In
employment decisions grounded in age-based stereotypes. 8
recognition that age discrimination can begin as early as age forty,
Congress included "any individual" age forty and older within the Act's
protected group. 9 However, Congress refrained from naming which
employer actions constitute "discriminatory practices" because of the
broad range of circumstances in which age discrimination can occur.' 0

Today, the baby boomer generation has achieved middle-age.1 The
youngest boomers will reach age forty and the oldest will be sixty in the
year 2006.12 This population currently represents approximately fortynine percent of the American workforce. 13 Better educated than previous
generations, these boomers are anticipated to increase litigation under

3
See GREGORY, supra note 2, at 16-30; Kaufman, supra note 2, at 827-28; see also infra text
accompanying notes 35-37.
4
See GREGORY, supra note 2, at 22-24 (summarizing common age-based stereotypes).
5
See infra note 60 and accompanying text (recognizing the need for a case-by-case
analysis of age discrimination claims because of the multitude of unique ways in which
such discrimination can occur); see also infra Part II.C.
6
See generally GREGORY, supra note 2, at 31-101 (illustrating discriminatory reductions in
force; early retirement plans; and hiring, promotion, demotion, and transfer systems).
7
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
8
See infra text accompanying notes 35-39.
9
See infra note 39 and text accompanying note 48.
10

See infra note 60.

1

See infra text accompanying notes 12-14.

12
13

See GREGORY, supra note 2, at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
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the ADEA as they actively respond
14
discrimination at work.

to perceived

acts

of age

The theory of reverse age discrimination within the protected group,
or a younger worker over age forty losing a job opportunity to a
relatively older worker, is one area of ADEA law rapidly evolving in
response to pressure from baby boomers. 15 In the last fifteen years,
federal courts have dealt with a succession of reverse discrimination
suits challenging everything from typical hiring and firing decisions to
age-based provisions in collective bargaining agreements and early
retirement programs.1 6 The Seventh Circuit and several lower federal
courts have refused to acknowledge reverse discrimination as a theory of
recovery under the ADEA. 17 However, the Sixth Circuit recently split
from the Seventh Circuit to hold that the ADEA does support such a
18
claim.
This Note argues that the ADEA contemplates relief for victims of
reverse age discrimination who are also members of the Act's protected
class.19 Part II describes the evolution of ADEA law, beginning with the
statutory history of the Act, continuing with the Act's purpose, and
ending with a discussion of ADEA reverse age discrimination
jurisprudence. 20 Part III outlines the split between the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits over reverse age discrimination. 21 Part IV analyzes the Act's
accommodation of reverse age discrimination in light of the statute's
language, history, and policy, and further concludes that the Equal
regulation
("EEOC")
Commission
Opportunity
Employment
interpreting the Act's nondiscrimination mandate does not exceed the
statute's scope. 22 Part IV also evaluates the conflict between the Sixth
and Seventh Circuits in light of these conclusions. 23 Part V suggests
model judicial reasoning for analyzing a reverse age discrimination
claim under the ADEA. 24 Through the process outlined above, this Note
advocates that only by recognizing protected class reverse age

14

Id.

15

2
23

See infra text accompanying notes 16-18.
See infra Parts IIC, III.
See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 20-24.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part IV.A-B.
See infra Part IV.C.

24

See infra Part V.

16
17
18
19
20

21
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discrimination claims can a court most fully effectuate the purposes of
the Act:
preventing arbitrary age discrimination and providing
employment opportunities for older workers.
II.

EVOLUTION OF

ADEA

LAW LEADING TO REVERSE AGE DISCRIMINATION

WITHIN THE PROTECTED CLASS

Reverse age discrimination is best understood as the product of an
evolving civil rights jurisprudence. 25
First, this Part traces the
development of reverse age discrimination under the ADEA within the
broader context of civil rights legislation.26 Next, this Part outlines the
purposes of the Act, as well as the potential conflict between those
purposes. 27 Finally, this Part discusses the role of reverse discrimination
28
as a theory of relief within the federal courts today.
A.

Statutory History of the ADEA

In response to growing civil rights awareness in the 1960s, Congress
enacted significant legislation designed to counteract discriminatory
employment practices. 29 The first of this legislation, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196430 ("Title VII"), specifically targeted employment
discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 31 During the debates for Title VII, members of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate encouraged Congress to add "age" to the
prohibited criteria for employment decisions.32 However, based on the
distinction that age, unlike race or sex, is not an immutable characteristic,

26
27
28

See infra text accompanying notes 26-28.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.

29

See GREGORY, supra note 2, at 16-22; JOSEPH E. KALET, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN

25

EMPLOYMENT LAW 1-3 (2d ed. 1990); see also H.R. REP. No. 805, at 1 (1967), reprinted in 1967
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2214.
30 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
31 See id. § 2000e-2(a). The overall goal of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to "achieve a
peaceful and voluntary settlement of the persistent problem of racial and religious
discrimination or segregation by establishments doing business with the general public,
and by labor unions and professional, business, and trade associations." S. REP. No. 872, at
1 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2355.
32 See Bryan B. Woodruff, Note, Unprotected Until Forty: The Limited Scope of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 73 IND. L.J. 1295, 1296-97 (1998) (noting that
proposals to add "age" to the Civil Rights Act by Representative John Dowdy and by
Senator George Smathers were struck down in each house, respectively); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 805, at 1, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2214.
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33
Congress did not include age within the Title VII protected groups.
Nevertheless, Congress ordered the Secretary of Labor, Willard Wirtz, to
study the problem of age discrimination to determine whether it should
be included in a future amendment to the Civil Rights Act. 34

In the resulting report, The Older American Worker-Age
Discrimination in Employment, Secretary Wirtz recommended that
Congress act to eliminate arbitrary age discrimination. 35 The Secretary
explained that an unfounded assumption that older workers were less
productive or less able than younger workers was significantly
burdening the economy as well as causing psychological harm to
unemployed older individuals. 36 However, he also determined that age,
which can sometimes affect job performance, should be considered
separately from race and gender, which do not.37 Following an
endorsement of the ADEA by President Lyndon B. Johnson, the

33 See KALET, supra note 29, at 2; Tara Van Ausdall, Note, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp.: Can an ADEA PlaintiffEverWin?, 33 TULSA L.J. 643, 652 (1997).
34 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265-66 (1964) ("The
Secretary of Labor shall make a full and complete study of the factors which might tend to
result in discrimination in employment because of age and of the consequences of such
discrimination on the economy and individuals affected.").
35 See H.R. REP. No. 805, at 2, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2214 ("A clear cut and
implemented Federal policy ... would provide a foundation for a much-needed vigorous,
nationwide campaign to promote hiring without discrimination on the basis of age."). The
report, which dealt with workers age forty-five and older, focused primarily on agerestrictive hiring policies commonly practiced by employers. See Woodruff, supra note 32,
at 1297. Secretary Wirtz recommended four actions to end such practices:
First: Action to eliminate arbitrary discrimination in employment.
Second: Action to adjust institutional arrangements which work to the
disadvantage of older workers.
Third: Action to increase the availability of work for older workers.
Fourth: Action to enlarge educational concepts and institutions to meet
the needs and opportunities of older age.
Howard C. Eglit, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act at Thirty: Where It's Been, Where
It Is Today, here It's Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 582-83 (1997). These actions do not
necessarily suggest that Congress did not intend the ADEA to reach reverse discrimination.
Cf. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 474 (6th Cir. 2002) (Cole, J.,
concurring), cert. granted,123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003).
36 See Woodruff, supra note 32, at 1297.
37 See Van Ausdall, supra note 33, at 652 (quoting the Secretary's statement that "age is
one minority group in which ... all seek ... eventual membership"); see also Eglit, supra
note 35, at 582-83 (quoting substantially from the Secretary's report on the characteristics of
age discrimination and the actions recommended to prevent it).
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Secretary submitted the proposed act to Congress, which later ratified it
39
38
as part of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") in 1967.
Within the United States, the ADEA applies to private employers
with twenty or more employees, employment agencies, labor
organizations, and the federal government. 40 The provisions of the
ADEA applicable to private employers have undergone two major
alterations in the Act's nearly forty-year lifespan. 41 First, Congress
enacted several amendments to raise, and ultimately abolish, the upper
age limit of the Act's protected class. 42 While the ADEA originally
protected employees between the ages of forty and sixty-five, 43 in 1978,
Congress raised the upper limit to seventy in response to concerns that

38 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000). The purpose of the FLSA is to correct and eliminate
"labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers." Id. § 202(a).
39 See H.R. REP. No. 805, at 2, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2214. President Johnson
endorsed the ADEA in his Older American message, in which he noted that employees age
forty-five and older comprised twenty-seven percent of the unemployed in 1967. Id. This
position reflects the original bill's prohibition of discrimination against employees age
forty-five to sixty-five. Id. at 6-7, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2219. The forty-five-yearold threshold was lowered to forty by Congress prior to the passage of the ADEA, upon a
finding that age discrimination in employment became apparent at that age. See STAFF OF
SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 95TH CONG., THE NEXT STEPS IN COMBATING AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT

POLICY 5 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter NEXT STEPS].
40
29 U.S.C. §§ 630(b)-(d), 633a(a). The ADEA also protects U.S. citizens employed
overseas by American employers or corporations controlled by American employers. See
H. Lane Dennard, Jr. & Kendall L. Kelly, Price Waterhouse: Alive and Well Under the Age
Discriminationin Employment Act, 51 MERCER L. REV. 721, 724 (2000). Originally, the ADEA
applied only to employees in the private sector but was extended to protect government
employees in 1974. See NEXT STEPS, supra note 39, at 7.
Employers to which the ADEA applies are still subject to state age discrimination
laws. See 29 U.S.C. § 633. The ADEA does not pre-empt state law but does require that an
ADEA plaintiff suspend any state age discrimination claim until the ADEA claim is
resolved. Id. § 633(a); see also S. REP. No. 95-493, at 5-7 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
504, 508-10 (explaining the federal-state relationship). As a second condition, a plaintiff
who first files a state discrimination claim must wait sixty days before filing an ADEA
claim unless the state claim has terminated. See 29 U.S.C. § 633(b); see also S. REP. No. 95493, at 5-7, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 508-10.
41 See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
42 See infra text accompanying notes 43-45.
43 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602,
607 (1967). Although airline stewardesses required to retire at the age of thirty-two
presented a compelling reason to reduce the age minimum further, Congress declined to
do so out of concern that lowering the minimum would weaken the ADEA's primary
purpose of "the promotion of employment opportunities for older workers." H.R. REP. No.
805, at 6, reprintedin 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2219.
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employers were mandating retirement after age sixty-five. 44 In 1986,
Congress amended the ADEA again to remove the upper age limit
altogether.45 The second shift in the ADEA was organizational. In 1978,
Congress moved enforcement responsibilities from the Department of
46
Labor to the EEOC.
Substantively, the ADEA mirrors Title VII, merely replacing the
words "race, color, religion, sex and national origin" with "age." 47 The
ADEA also retains the neutral terminology of Title VII, prohibiting

See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
92 Stat. 189 (1978); see also S. REP. No. 95493, at 7, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 510; NEXT
STEPs, supra note 39, at 5, 8; KALET, supra note 29, at 7-9. Due to a lack of information
regarding the impact of unemployment on those older than age seventy, Congress was not
prepared to entirely abolish the age limit. S. REP. No. 95-493, at 7, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 510.
However, Congress felt that raising the age limit would still
substantially reduce the effects of mandatory retirement. Id.
45
See Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100
Stat. 3342 (1986); see also KALET, supra note 29, at 11-12. Congress removed the age limit in
an effort to eliminate mandatory retirement, which had not been satisfactorily remedied by
the 1978 amendments.
See generally H.R. REP. No. 99-756 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5628. The ADEA now protects "individuals who are at least 40 years of age."
29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
46
See Kaufman, supra note 2, at 834-35. For an explanation of the Reorganization Plan
that transferred enforcement authority to the EEOC, see Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC,
the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in
Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51, 66-68.
47
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (Title VII), with 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2) (ADEA).
See also Dennard & Kelly, supra note 40, at 724-27. Title VII states that it is unlawful for an
employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). By comparison, the ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's age ....
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2).
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discriminatory employment practices with respect to "any individual...
because of such individual's age." 48 As a third substantive similarity to
Title VII, the ADEA broadly prohibits discrimination in the areas of
"hiring, discharges, treatment during employment, advertising, and
retaliation." 49 However, the ADEA provides several exceptions that
enable an employer to consider age.50 In § 623(f), the ADEA permits an
employer to consider age when it is "a bona fide occupational
qualification, ... to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system that
is not intended to evade the purposes of this [Act, and] to observe the
terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan."51 With each of these

48
49
50

Id. § 623.
See Dennard & Kelly, supra note 40, at 726.
See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
51
See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f), which permits an employer:
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited [by] this section where age
is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the particular business, or where the
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age...
(2) to take any action otherwise prohibited [by] this section(A) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system that is not
intended to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such
seniority system shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of
any individual... because of the age of such individual; or
(B) to observe the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan (i) where, for each benefit or benefit package, the actual amount of
payment made or cost incurred on behalf of an older worker is no less
than that made or incurred on behalf of a younger worker ... ; or
(ii) that is a voluntary early retirement incentive plan consistent with
the relevant purpose or purposes of this chapter.
Id. § 623(0. Congress added the seniority system and employee benefit plan exceptions as
amendments to the ADEA through the Older Worker Benefit Protection Act ("OWBPA") in
1990. See generally Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978
(1990). OWBPA also permitted employers to set a minimum age for retirement benefits
connected with pension plans. Id. This provision is codified in § 623(l)(1)(A) of the ADEA.
Id.
Congress enacted OWBPA to overrule the Supreme Court's decision in Pub. Employees
Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), in which the Court "held that the ADEA
permitted arbitrary age discrimination in employee benefit plans." S. REP. No. 101-263, at 5
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1510. Congress intended OWBPA to clarify that
"discrimination on the basis of age in virtually all forms of employee benefits is unlawful."
Id. at 5, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1510. The Senate Report accompanying OWBPA
emphasized that benefit reductions may only be justified by corresponding cost increases
to cover older workers. See id. at 5-16, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1510-21.
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exceptions, the employer may not use age as the sole criterion in its
52
employment decision.
In contrast to the substantive provisions of the ADEA, the Act's
remedial and procedural provisions originally paralleled those of the
FLSA, rather than Title VII.53 For example, the right to a jury trial
available under the ADEA only became available to Title VII plaintiffs in
1991. 54 Although the 1991 amendments to Title VII brought the statute
into greater alignment with the ADEA, an ADEA plaintiff still has
individual remedies distinct from those available under Title VII. s5 For
example, an ADEA plaintiff may receive liquidated damages for an
employer's willful violations, but a Title VII plaintiff may only claim
Additionally, reasonable
compensatory and punitive damages. 56
attorneys' fees are mandatory under the ADEA but only discretionary
under Title VII.57 Finally, ADEA class action suits and waiver of age
claims follow the provisions set forth in the FLSA, rather than in Title
VII.58

See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0; see, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 12021 (1985) (" [I]f TWA does grant some disqualified captains the 'privilege' of 'bumping' less
senior flight engineers, it may not deny this opportunity to others because of their age.");
Karlen v. City Colts. of Chi., 837 F.2d 314, 318-19 (7th Cir. 1988) (concluding that
qualification for an early retirement plan may not be based solely on age); Miss. Power &
Light Co. v. Local Union Nos. 605 & 985, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 945 F. Supp. 980, 985
(S.D. Miss. 1996) (holding that a workplace transfer provision facially violates the ADEA by
using age as the sole criterion), affd, 102 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 1996); S.REP. No. 101-263, at 516, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1510-21.
53 See Dennard & Kelly, supra note 40, at 725-32; supra note 38 (stating the purpose of the
FLSA).
54 See Dennard & Kelly, supra note 40, at 725-32.
55 Id.; see infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
56
See Dennard & Kelly, supra note 40, at 728-29.
57 Id. Under the ADEA, only plaintiffs may recover attorneys' fees. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971). Under
Title VII, both plaintiffs and defendants can recover fees, but under different standards.
See, e.g., Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). As a practical matter,
there is little difference between the mandatory nature of attorneys' fees under the ADEA
and the discretionary nature of the fees under Title VII. Cf. id. at 415-17. A court will
generally award attorney fees to a Title VII plaintiff unless special circumstances render the
award unjust. Id. A prevailing Title VII defendant can receive fees if the plaintiff's
complaint was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought
in subjective bad faith." Id. at 421.
5
See Dennard & Kelly, supra note 40, at 731-32.
52
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Purposeof the ADEA

The ADEA has two primary purposes: (1) to "prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment" and (2) to "promote employment of
In the
older persons based on their ability rather than age." 59
administration of these goals, Congress has indicated that courts must
treat each ADEA case on an individual basis, rather than making broad
assumptions about what types of activities are or are not permissible. 60

59 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (the Congressional statement of findings and purpose). The third
listed purpose is "to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising
from the impact of age on employment." Id. The findings on which these purposes rest
are:
The Congress hereby finds and declares that(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find
themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and
especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job
performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise
desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons;
of
unemployment, especially long-term
(3) the incidence
unemployment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and
employer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high among
older workers; their numbers are great and growing; and their
employment problems grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary
discrimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce and
the free flow of goods in commerce.
Id. § 621(a); see also H.R. REP. No. 805, at 4 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2217.
The Congressional reports that accompanied the 1978 and 1986 amendments also stated the
Act's purpose in this dual manner. See generally H.R. REP. No. 99-756 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5628; S. REP. No. 95493 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504. For
example, in the Senate report accompanying the 1978 amendments, the Senate placed equal
value on all three prongs of the published Statement of Findings and Purpose, although it
seemed to support its argument for raising the protected class maximum age to seventy on
the grounds that mandatory retirement was arbitrary discrimination. S. REP. No. 95-493, at
2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 506 ("A person with the ability and desire to work
should not be denied that opportunity solely because of age."). For an illustration of how
the Department of Labor harmonized these purposes to Congress' approval with regard to
employee benefits that differentiate based on age, see S. REP. No. 101-263, at 8 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1512-13.
60 See H.R. REP. NO. 805, at 7, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2220. In the House report
accompanying the original bill, Congress noted that "[t]he case-by-case basis should serve
as the underlying rule in the administration of the legislation. Too many different types of
situations in employment occur for the strict application of general prohibitions and
provisions." Id. Several courts have also suggested that age discrimination claims must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis because age is a relative, rather than absolute,
characteristic. See, e.g., Dorsch v. L.B. Foster Co., 782 F.2d 1421, 1428 (7th Cir. 1986)
(recommending a case-by-case approach to determine whether an employer's method of
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Nevertheless, as preventing arbitrary discrimination and aiding older
workers are not necessarily synonymous, application of the ADEA
61
statement of purpose has led to disagreements over Congress' intent.
In his 1983 article, Barry Bennett Kaufman illustrated the potential
conflict between eliminating arbitrary age discrimination and promoting
the employment of older workers by explaining that the legislative

paying retirement benefits is a bona fide employee benefit plan under the ADEA); Rock v.
Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 424 N.E.2d 244, 248 (Mass. 1981) ("Because age is a
relative rather than absolute status when taken as a basis for discrimination, it need not
follow that all persons protected by the Act ADEA should be grouped together for
purposes of delineating the extent of their protection.") (quoting Moore v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 464 F. Supp. 357, 366 (N.D. Ga. 1979)).
61
See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text; infra Part III. In addition to disagreeing
over congressional policy and statutory interpretation of § 623, courts have not consistently
interpreted the age forty limit in § 631(a) of the statute. See, e.g., Cline v. Gen. Dynamics
Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 469 (6th Cir. 2002) (criticizing the district court's interpretation
of § 631 as requiring that the plaintiff be both over age thirty-nine and relatively older than
the replacement), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003); Brown v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp.,
No. 94-C3759, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2554, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 1996) (holding that the age
forty limit precludes reverse discrimination claims asserted by plaintiffs younger than the
protected class); Conn v. First Union Bank of Va., No. 94-0901-R, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9242, at *3 (W.D. Va. Mar. 17, 1995) (interpreting the age forty limit to mean that Congress
did not anticipate claims of reverse age discrimination).
Reliance on the age forty limit as a bar to reverse discrimination has also led to some
bizarre results in comparisons between the ADEA and state discrimination laws. For
example, a Michigan court held that a section of the Michigan Civil Rights Act prohibiting
employment discrimination "'against any individual ... because of... age"' should allow
claims for reverse discrimination. Zanni v. Medaphis Physician Servs. Corp., 612 N.W.2d
858, 860-61 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (following earlier case precedent rejecting reverse
discrimination claims but commenting that the precedent was in error), rev'd on reh'g, 612
N.W.2d 845 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (approving of the previous panel's discussion of reverse
discrimination). This language is virtually indistinguishable from the language in the
ADEA, which also bars discrimination against "any individual ... because of such
individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623. In order to distinguish its decision from prior ADEA
cases decided by the Seventh Circuit that had rejected reverse discrimination, the Michigan
Court of Appeals noted that the Michigan Civil Rights Act contained no similar limitation
on the plaintiff's age. See Zanni, 612 N.W.2d at 860-61. In light of the Michigan statute's
unlimited protected class, the court concluded, "[W]e believe that the [Michigan]
Legislature expressed an intent to prohibit employers from engaging in discriminatory
practices against workers considered 'too young' as well as workers considered 'too old.'"
Id. at 861.
The court never clarified whether it considered the type of reverse
discrimination barred by the ADEA to be those claims brought by members of the
protected class or outside of it. See id. A similar analysis and result occurred in Bergen
Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944 (N.J. 1999) (comparing New Jersey law to the
ADEA). See also Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 870 F. Supp. 389, 405 n.27 (D. Me. 1994)
(comparing Maine age discrimination statutes), affd, 60 F.3d 809 (1st Cir. 1995); State v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 624, 509 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (comparing Minnesota age
discrimination statutes), affd, 533 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1995).
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history supports both an allocative and nondiscrimination application of
the ADEA. 62 In the allocative model, age may be considered in
employment decisions as a means to define needs and inform
discretionary decisions. 63 By contrast, in a nondiscrimination model, age
may not be considered in making either allocative or regulatory
decisions.64 Because neither the Act nor its supporting legislative history
defines unlawful age discrimination, and because Congress' statements
of purpose regarding the Act's ban on discrimination against "any
individual" do not clearly state the policy that Congress was intending
to enforce, Kaufman argued that the ADEA does not clearly indicate
which types of plaintiffs within the protected age group have standing to
sue.

65

The EEOC has also given little guidance on this issue, offering only
one regulation to aid a court's determination of the rights of one member
of the protected group when replaced by another. 66 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2,
entitled "Discrimination between individuals protected by the Act,"
states:
It is unlawful ... for an employer to discriminate in
hiring or in any other way by giving preference because
of age between individuals 40 and over. Thus, if two
people apply for the same position, and one is 42 and the
other 52, the employer may not lawfully turn down
either one on the basis of age, but must make such
67
decision on the basis of some other factor.
Both commentators and courts have recognized that a literal reading
of this regulation enables members of the protected group to sue their
62 See Kaufman, supra note 2, at 836-42.
63 Id. at 837-42. Kaufman argues that this framework is best for redistributing social
resources. Id. at 837.
64 Id. Kaufman thinks this is the best framework to combat false stereotypes or arbitrary
decisions. Id. This model seems to match the purpose of the ADEA, although Kaufman
argues that the allocative model is best. Id. at 855-56. For a discussion of the ADEA's goals,
see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
65
See Kaufman, supra note 2, at 832-36, 846.
66 See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. Courts have had difficulty interpreting
the breadth of this regulation. See infra note 69. The EEOC's own administrative
adjudications have utilized regulation 1625.2 to strike down reverse discrimination
practices that appear arbitrary. See, e.g., Garrett, 1997 WL 574739, at *1-3 (E.E.O.C. Sept. 5,
1997), affd, 1999 WL 909980, at *1-3 (E.E.O.C. Sept. 30, 1999) (using age to determine
seniority violates the ADEA).
67 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (2002).
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employer if replaced by someone either younger or older.68 However,
several courts have put a limiting construction on the statute out of
concern that Congress did not intend to permit claims of "reverse
69
discrimination" under the ADEA.
C. Reverse Discrimination
"Reverse discrimination" is defined as the right of a younger worker
to sue his or her employer because the employer gave preferential
treatment to someone older on account of age. 70 The theory of reverse
discrimination evolved under Civil Rights Act jurisprudence. 71 For
example, as between racial groups under Title VII, a non-minority
plaintiff may successfully state a claim for relief when replaced by a
minority worker. 72 In this manner, Title VII plaintiffs have successfully
challenged employer actions that indicate a preference for traditionally
73
disenfranchised individuals.

See Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1227-28 (7th Cir. 1992); Conn v. First
Union Bank of Va., No. 94-0901-R, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9242, at *5-6 (W.D. Va. Mar. 17,
1995) ("A literal reading of this regulation may support the plaintiff's position."); Michael
C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation,88 VA. L. REv. 951, 993 (2002); Kaufman, supra note 2,
at 832-36.
69 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227-28 ("[To the extent that regulation 1625.2 can be read to
authorize reverse age discrimination suits, we think that it exceeds the scope of the
statute."); Conn, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9242, at *6-7 ("To the extent the regulation could
apply in this case, I agree with the Hamilton court that it exceeds the scope of the statute.
Accordingly, I decline to follow it."); Crommie v. California, No. C 89-4433 BAC consol.
No. C 90-1150 BAC, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4714, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. April 6, 1993) (limiting
construction of the regulation to protect only older employees vis-A-vis younger
employees). But see La Montagne v. Am. Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1411 n.4
(7th Cir. 1984). The La Montagne court concluded that the regulation "merely clarified the
point that an employer is not insulated from liability ... when he chooses among people in
the protected class." Id. The Seventh Circuit initially read La Montagne narrowly to stand
for the proposition that only discrimination against employees relatively older than their
replacements is prohibited. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228. Yet two years after Hamilton, the
court returned to the La Montagne court's general admonition that the regulation protects
employees even when their replacement is within the protected class. Kralman v. Ill. Dep't
of Veterans' Affairs, 23 F.3d 150, 155-56 (7th Cir. 1994).
70
See Jeffrey Paul Fuhrman, Comment, Can Discrimination Law Affect the Imposition of a
Minimum Age Requirement for Employment in the National Basketball Association?, 3 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 585,600-01 (2001).
71 Id. In the context of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, reverse discrimination is defined as
"discrimination against historically and socially favored groups." Craven v. Tex. Dep't of
Crim. Justice- Institutional Div., 151 F. Supp. 2d 757, 764 n.5 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
72 See Fuhrman, supra note 70, at 600-01.
73 Id.; see, e.g., Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549 (1988) (awarding prejudgment interest to a
male postal worker for sex discrimination under Title VII); Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty.
68
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Due to the similarities between Title VII and the ADEA, courts have
frequently applied Title VII substantive case law to ADEA claims. 74
Consequently, ADEA plaintiffs have attempted application of the Title
VII discrimination theories to their age discrimination claims.75 The
76
approaches taken by ADEA plaintiffs can be divided into three groups.
First, some plaintiff employees outside the protected age group (younger
than forty) have attempted to establish a cause of action when replaced
by a member within the protected group. 77 In these situations, courts
have consistently held that the ADEA does not protect an employee
outside the protected age group from reverse age discrimination. 78
In the second category of age discrimination claims, older plaintiffs
within the protected group have attempted to prove an ADEA violation

Coll., 314 F.3d 249 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that an employer violated Title VII when the
white plaintiff lost several promotions to lesser-qualified black coworkers).
74
See Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 870 F. Supp. 389, 394 (D. Me. 1994) ("Because of the
similarity between the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, federal courts have
historically applied the standards used for Title VII to ADEA."), affd, 60 F.3d 809 (1st Cir.
1995). Despite an overall consensus that Title VII law may generally be applied to the
ADEA, courts have not always agreed on the extent of the analogy. See Kaufman, supra
note 2, at 842-46. One major disagreement in the federal courts has been over whether the
ADEA parallels Title VII in allowing relief on a theory of disparate impact. See, e.g., Peter
Reed Corbin & John E. Duvall, Employment Discrimination,53 MERCER L. REV. 1367, 1384-85
(2002); Dennard & Kelly, supra note 40, at 735-36. For example, the Seventh Circuit noted
that "[tihe adverse impact analysis developed in Title VII cases cannot be extended easily
to age cases." Dorsch v. L.B. Foster Co., 782 F.2d 1421, 1428 (7th Cir. 1986). Conversely, the
Graffam court found that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination under
the Title VII disparate impact test. 870 F. Supp. at 394-405.
75
See Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1227 (7th Cir. 1992). A common
argument is that "age discrimination is like race or sex discrimination-it cuts both ways."
Id.
76 See infra text accompanying notes 77-112.
77
See, e.g., Brown v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., No. 94-C3759, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2554,
at "10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 1996); Williams v. Pemberton Township Pub. Sch., 733 A.2d 571, 578
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
78
See Brown, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2554, at *10 ("[T]he ADEA does not provide a cause
of action for age discrimination claims asserted by those under age 40."); Williams, 733 A.2d
at 578 ("In light of the various contexts in which employment discrimination claims arise,
we consider it unwise to require a plaintiff to establish unfailingly as part of the prima facie
case that plaintiff was replaced by an individual outside the plaintiff's protected class.").
Some plaintiffs in this category have also attempted to establish reverse
discrimination when an employer's actions have adversely affected their interests. For
example, in Brown, plaintiffs under age forty claimed that their termination when their
employer's plant closed was orchestrated to cover up discrimination against plaintiffs over
forty. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2554, at *3. In dismissing this theory, the court held that these
plaintiffs failed to state a claim because all employees where treated equally (all were
terminated), regardless of age. Id. at *10-11.
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when their replacement was a younger member of the protected group. 79
For example, a sixty-year-old might argue reverse discrimination when
replaced by a forty-year-old. While this scenario is not "reverse" age
discrimination, the manner in which courts have interpreted the ADEA
as it relates to these plaintiffs has had a clear impact on reverse age
discrimination law.8 0 Courts initially disagreed over whether these
plaintiffs had a cause of action.81 The Supreme Court ultimately resolved
82
the debate in O'Connorv. Consolidated Coin CaterersCorp.
In O'Connor, plaintiff James O'Connor was fired at age fifty-six and
replaced by a forty-year-old. 83 He filed suit against his employer under
the ADEA, claiming that his termination was due to his age. 84 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that in order to establish a prima facie
case of age discrimination, O'Connor initially had to satisfy the elements
of the McDonnell Douglas test, a four-element test used to make a prima
facie showing of discriminatory treatment in Title VII cases. 85 Because
the court interpreted the final criteria of the test as requiring the plaintiff

79 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 309-10 (1996)
(replacing fifty-six-year-old with forty-year-old); Kralman v. Ill. Dep't of Veterans' Affairs,
23 F.3d 150, 152 (7th Cir. 1994) (replacing seventy-one-year-old with forty-six-year-old);
Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1981) (replacing fifty-four-year-old with
forty-nine-year-old).
80
See infra text accompanying notes 81-112. The Kralman court noted, "[I1t is considered
'hombook law' that the ADEA action can be based on discrimination between older and
younger members of the protected class." 23 F.3d at 155. The Supreme Court refined this
general observation by clarifying the rights of an older employee replaced by a younger
person in O'Connor. See 517 U.S. 308. For a discussion of how the lower federal courts
have used O'Connor, see infra notes 107, 183-88 and accompanying text.
81 See, e.g., Williams, 733 A.2d at 577-78 (listing the courts which have ruled on both sides
of this issue). For example, in Douglas, the defendant employer urged the Ninth Circuit to
adopt the rule of the Fifth Circuit that the replacement must be outside the protected class.
656 F.2d at 532. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, choosing instead to follow
precedent that ignored this distinction. Id. at 532-34.
82 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
83

Id. at 309-10.

94

Id. at 309.
Id. at 309-10. The McDonnell Douglas test in a Title VII context enables a plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing
(i) that he belongs to a [disfavored class]; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of [the] complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 310 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
85
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to show replacement by someone outside the protected class, the court
86
determined that the plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case.
Without ruling on whether the McDonnell Douglas test is appropriate
in ADEA cases, the Supreme Court determined that the Fourth Circuit
had no rational basis for requiring the former employee's replacement to
be outside the protected age group.8 7 To reach this determination, the
Court looked to the ban on discrimination against "any individual ...
because of such individual's age" articulated in § 623, as well as the
protective limit to employees age forty and above established by § 631 of
the ADEA.8 8 The Court noted that the language of these statutes
does not ban discrimination against employees because
they are aged 40 or older; it bans discrimination against
employees because of their age, but limits the protected
class to those who are 40 or older. The fact that one
person in the protected class has lost out to another
person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as
89
he has lost out because of his age.
Following this reasoning, the Court argued that a prima facie case
requires establishing that an employment decision was based on an
illegal discriminatory criterion, and not where the plaintiff's replacement
fell in relation to the protected class. 90 The Court concluded that
replacement by a person "substantially younger" than the plaintiff is a
more reliable indication of age discrimination than replacement by
someone outside the protected class. 91 Replacement by someone only
92
insignificantly younger would not establish a prima facie case at all.
The applicability of what courts have coined the O'Connor
"substantially younger" test to the third category of ADEA plaintiffs is
not clear. 93 In this category, a younger member of the protected class

86
87

Id.
Id. at 312.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90 Id. at 312-13. The Court concluded that "the prima facie case requires 'evidence
adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on aln] [illegal]
discriminatory criterion."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977)).
91 Id. at 313.
92

Id.

93

See infra notes 94-112 and accompanying text.
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94
claims reverse discrimination because his or her replacement was older.
For example, a fifty-year-old may attempt to establish discrimination
when replaced by a sixty-year-old. Employees commonly use this
theory of discrimination to challenge the components of employer
programs that create a preference for older workers, such as retirement
benefits provisions. 95 At least one employer has also successfully used
this theory to strike down a collective bargaining agreement provision
96
keyed to employee age.

Following O'Connor,the EEOC issued an Enforcement Guidance that
was carefully neutral to the question of whether a plaintiff must be

See Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944, 947-48 (N.J. 1999). For example, a
twenty-five-year-old plaintiff successfully asserted a reverse age discrimination claim
against his employer when he was fired and replaced by a thirty-one-year-old in Bergen. Id.
This case was decided under a New Jersey discrimination law comparable to the ADEA but
that did not limit its coverage to employees over age forty. Id. at 949-50.
95
See, e.g., Cline v.. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2002)
(challenging a collective bargaining agreement that removed eligibility for full health
benefits upon retirement for plaintiffs age forty to forty-nine), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786
(2003); Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1227 (7th Cir. 1992) (alleging that
plaintiffs between ages forty and fifty were too young to receive early retirement benefits
when plants closed); Greer v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., No. 00 Civ. 1272 (SAS), 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1382, at *1, 9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2001) (alleging that a pension program
was unlawful because older employees who had worked for fewer years received a higher
percentage of pension benefits than did fifty-three-year-old plaintiff); Dittman v. Gen.
Motors Corp. - Delco Chassis Div., 941 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D. Conn. 1996) (objecting to plant
closing agreement that made early retirement available only to those over age fifty, to the
exclusion of plaintiffs between ages forty and fifty), affd, 116 F.3d 465 (2d Cir. 1997); Conn
v. First Union Bank of Va., No. 94-0901-R, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9242, at *1-2 (W.D. Va. Mar.
17, 1995) (alleging age discrimination towards plaintiffs between the ages of forty and fiftyfive when employer discontinued Executive Life Insurance Program for employees under
age fifty-five); Wehrly v. Am. Motors Sales Corp., 678 F. Supp. 1366, 1380-81 (N.D. Ind.
1988) (challenging Early Retirement program that was only available to employees age
fifty-five and older with ten years of service, to the exclusion of fifty-four-year-old
plaintiff); Isabella, 1995 WL 653513 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 19, 1995) (challenging early retirement
program benefiting employees age fifty-five and older, to the exclusion of plaintiffs under
the age of fifty-five); Dupriest, 1994 WL 735178 (E.E.O.C. May 2, 1994) (challenging early
retirement program benefiting employees age fifty and over, to the exclusion of forty-fiveyear-old plaintiff).
96
See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Local Union Nos. 605 & 985, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 945 F. Supp. 980, 981-82 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (challenging a collective bargaining
agreement provision that allowed disabled employees between the ages of sixty and sixtyfive and with thirty years of service to resist transfer of location), affd, 102 F.3d 551 (5th Cir.
1996). The Miss. Power & Light Co. court concluded that the provision facially violated the
ADEA. Id. at 985.
94
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replaced by someone younger in order to have a viable claim.97 Within
the Enforcement Guidance, the EEOC stated that the replacement's age is
not relevant in establishing a prima facie case. 98 Furthermore, the EEOC
broadly interpreted the O'Connor holding to be: "[Wihen the age of a
replacement is made a part of the prima facie case, that case is not
defeated solely because the replacement happens to be within the
protected age group." 99 The EEOC's neutral stance parallels the courts'
unease in ruling on this issue. 100
Prior to O'Connor, the Seventh Circuit was the only circuit court to
take a pronounced stance on whether the ADEA allowed a claim for
reverse discrimination within the protected class. 10 1 In Hamilton v.
Caterpillar, Inc.,102 the court concluded that no such claim could be
permitted on policy grounds alone. 0 3 While acknowledged by nearly all
subsequent federal circuit cases dealing with reverse discrimination
within the protected class, the Hamilton reasoning has been critical to the
holding of only a few. 1°4 Rather, the majority of courts citing Hamilton

97

See generally EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON O'CONNOR V. CONSOLIDATED COIN

CATERERS CORP. (1996), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/oconnor.htm] (last visited
Nov. 25, 2003) [hereinafter GUIDANCE].
98

The EEOC states:

O'Connor is consistent with the Commission's long-standing position
that an ADEA charge should never be rejected or dismissed on the
merits solely because a charging party states that his or her
replacement (or comparator) is an individual within the ADEA's
protected age group (40 and older).
Indeed, it is the Commission's view that the characteristics of the
comparator are not a necessary element of the prima facie case under
the ADEA.
Id. at Part II.2.A.
99 Id. at Part II.3.A.
100 See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
101 Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992). Prior to Hamilton, one
district court within the Seventh Circuit expressly ruled that the ADEA did not provide a
cause of action for plaintiffs claiming reverse discrimination. See Wehrly v. Am. Motors
Sales Corp., 678 F. Supp. 1366, 1380-83 (N.D. Ind. 1988).
102 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992).
103

See infra Part III.A.

104 See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 846 (N.D. Ohio 2000),
overruled, 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted,123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003); Parker v. Wakelin,
882 F. Supp. 1131, 1140-41 (D. Me. 1995) (dismissing age discrimination claim because
"[tihe ADEA has never been construed to permit younger persons to claim discrimination
against them in favor of older persons"), affid in part, rev'd in parton other grounds, 123 F.3d
1 (1st Cir. 1997); Conn v. First Union Bank of Va., No. 94-0901-R, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9242,
at *3-7 (W.D. Va. Mar. 17, 1995).
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have either given general approval for the language of the court but
decided the issue before them on more secure grounds, 10 5 or they have
expressly declined to rule on the question1 06 After O'Connor, only one
district court has implicitly aligned the "substantially younger" test with
Hamilton by extending the O'Connor holding regarding older plaintiffs
replaced by younger workers to also prohibit claims by younger
10 7
plaintiffs replaced by older workers.
However, the Sixth Circuit recently rejected Hamilton and
distinguished O'Connor from the protected class reverse discrimination
context in Cline v. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc.1°8 Rather than
evaluating the ADEA on the basis of policy, the Cline court utilized

The EEOC administrative adjudications that rely on Hamilton use the case strictly to
strike down challenges to early retirement benefits programs. See, e.g., Isabella, 1995 WL
653513 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 19, 1995); Dupriest, 1994 WL 735178 (E.E.O.C. May 2, 1994). The
Dupriest court cited Hamilton, but noted that the ADEA already protects early retirement
programs. 1994 WL 735178, at *3. The Isabella court cited Dupriest for this same
proposition. 1995 WL 653513, at *2.
105
See Dittman v. Gen. Motors Corp. - Delco Chassis Div., 941 F. Supp. 284, 286-87 (D.
Conn. 1996) (concluding that under Hamilton, the ADEA does not provide a claim for
reverse discrimination, but holding that the program in question was a bona fide employee
pension benefit plan, and that as such, plaintiffs over age forty could not challenge their
exclusion from it), affd, 116 F.3d 465 (2d Cir. 1997); Brown v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., No.
94-C3759, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2554, at *8-11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 1996) (concluding that even
if a claim for reverse discrimination were viable, the plaintiffs' complaint failed to show
they were treated differently than all other employees); State v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 624,
509 N.W.2d 572, 576 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (analogizing the ADEA to the Minnesota
Human Rights Act) ("Because of our disposition of this case under section 465.72, and
because of differences between the ADEA and the Human Rights Act, we do not directly
rely on Hamilton. We otherwise express no opinion on the broader question of 'reverse'
age discrimination protected under the Human Rights Act."), affd, 533 N.W.2d 393 (Minn.
1995).
106
See Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58 F.3d 434, 436-37 (9th Cir. 1995) (declining to address
the validity of the district court's reliance on Hamilton and holding instead that the ADEA
denied plaintiff's claim on grounds that the plan at issue was a bona fide pension benefit
plan under § 623(l)(1)(a)); Edwards v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 2 F.3d 382, 383
(11th Cir. 1993) ("We, however, do not decide the question of whether this kind of reverse
discrimination is, as a matter of law, ever covered by the ADEA."); Greer v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp., No. 00 Civ. 1272 (SAS), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1382, at *13-16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15,
2001) (noting that the Second Circuit has not decided the issue, but "[e]ven if the ADEA
does allow for reverse age discrimination claims, plaintiff's claim must still fail").
107
Mathis v. Pete Georges Chevrolet, Inc., No. 96-C7938, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2458, at *810 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 1998). The Mathis court broadly concluded that O'Connor required
only that the plaintiff be replaced by a younger person. Id. However, the court did not
discuss the relative ages of the plaintiff and his replacements or consider the "substantially
younger" language of O'Connor. Id.
108 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted,123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003).
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principles of statutory interpretation to hold that the ADEA allows
claims for reverse discrimination brought by members of the protected
class.1°9 Prior to Cline, several courts had suggested that the ADEA
provides relief for these reverse discrimination plaintiffs. 110 Yet like
many of the courts citing Hamilton, the majority of cases containing
language in support of the reverse discrimination possibility were only
cursory in their analysis of the issue."' Therefore, Hamilton and Cline
remain the principal voices on whether the ADEA allows for reverse
112
discrimination claims brought by members of the protected class.
11.

CIRCUIT SPLIT

This Part establishes the basic arguments on both sides of the reverse
discrimination debate through a description of the circuit split between
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits." 3 First, this Part sets forth the Seventh
Circuit decision of Hamilton v. Caterpillar,Inc., holding that the ADEA
bars reverse discrimination claims." 4 Following Hamilton, this Part
describes the Sixth Circuit decision of Cline v. General Dynamics Land
5
Systems, Inc., holding that the ADEA supports such claims."
A.

The Seventh Circuit

In Hamilton v. Caterpillar Inc.,116 the Seventh Circuit held that the
ADEA did not permit reverse discrimination claims brought by
members of the protected class. 117 Michael Hamilton, the named
plaintiff in a class action against Caterpillar, claimed that Caterpillar's

109 See id.
110 See Brennan v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 545, 550, 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Miss.
Power & Light Co. v. Local Union Nos. 605 & 985, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 945 F. Supp.
980, 984-85 (S.D. Miss. 1996) ("Because this provision against transferring is keyed to an
employee's age, it is facially violative of the ADEA."), affd, 102 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 1996). In
Brennan, the court concluded, "The plaintiff is [a] disabled male over forty, which places
him in protected classes under ADEA and the ADA, and renders his reverse discrimination
claim possible.... Although the Second Circuit has not yet ruled on the validity of this
inference, the Court finds its application, even if not appropriate in all cases, is appropriate
here." 950 F. Supp. at 550-52.
ill
See, e.g., Brennan, 950 F. Supp. at 551-52; Miss. Power & Light, 945 F. Supp. at 984-85.
112 See infra Part Il.
113 See infra text accompanying notes 114-15.
114 See infra Part III.A.
115 See infra Part II.B.
116 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992).
117 Id. at 1228.
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Special Early Retirement Program ("SERP") violated the ADEA because
it discriminated against employees between the ages of forty and fifty.118
In light of potential closings of two Iowa plants, Caterpillar had
negotiated SERP with the local union representing the Iowa
employees. 119 The plan was to go into effect if the plants closed. 120 Prior
to SERP, Caterpillar's pension program provided pension benefits on
two tiers. 121 First, employees age sixty or older with ten years of service
were eligible to receive pension benefits. 122 Second, employees age fiftyfive and older were eligible for benefits, provided that the combination
of their age and years of service totaled eighty-five. 123 SERP altered this
benefit program to include employees age fifty or older with ten years of
service .124
By June of 1988, Caterpillar had shut down both Iowa plants and
laid off all of the employees. 125 In 1990, Hamilton instigated a class
action on behalf of employees age forty to fifty who had ten years of
experience at the time of the plant closings, but who were too young to
receive benefits. 126 The district court dismissed Hamilton's claim,
127
holding that reverse discrimination is not prohibited by the ADEA.
However, the district court declined to rest its holding entirely on this
proposition, concluding instead that even if reverse discrimination were
28
prohibited, SERP was a bona fide employee benefit plan.
Reviewing the case on appeal, the Seventh Circuit observed that the
reverse discrimination claim was an issue of first impression for the
court and looked to the language of two decisions within the Seventh
Circuit and one decision by the First Circuit for guidance. 129 In Karlen v.

118 Id. at 1227. Hamilton's theory of discrimination is the third category of reverse
discrimination plaintiffs: plaintiffs over age forty claiming a violation of the ADEA
because older members of the protected group receive preferential treatment. See supra text
accompanying note 94.
119 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1226-27.
120 Id. at 1227.
121

Id.

122

Id.

123

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

124
125

126

Id.
129 Id. Several other courts have performed similar maneuvers around the question of
reverse discrimination. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
129 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227.
127
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City Colleges of Chicago,30° a Seventh Circuit decision, three professors
claimed that an Early Retirement Program violated the ADEA by
131
discriminating against older employees within the protected group.
The Karlen court concluded that, unlike Title VII's evenhanded
protection for sexes and races, the ADEA did not protect all ages
equally. 132 Similarly, the Hamilton court looked to the First Circuit
decision in Schuler v. Polaroid Corp.133 for the proposition that the ADEA
permitted preference of older persons. 34 Schuler involved a fifty-sevenyear-old plaintiff who claimed that he was constructively discharged in
violation of the ADEA.135 The First Circuit noted that the severance
package offered to Schuler was an inappropriate basis for an age
discrimination claim because it was "a carrot, not a stick," which was not
forbidden by the ADEA.136 Finally, the Hamilton court noted that in
Wehrly v. American Motor Sales Corp.,1 37 an Indiana federal district court
conclusively held that the ADEA does not permit claims for reverse
discrimination.138 Taken together, the Hamilton court cited these three

130 837 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1988). Karlen was an appeal of summary judgment granted in
favor of the defendants. Id. at 320.
131 Id. at 315, 318. This fact pattern is the opposite of that facing the Hamilton court. See
supra text accompanying notes 118-24. Consequently, aside from the language quoted in
note 132 infra, the Karlan court focused its analysis on discrimination against relatively
older employees. See id. at 318-20. The court concluded that the sick leave and insurance
portions of the Early Retirement Plan resembled more of a stick and less of a carrot, and,
therefore, summary judgment for the defendants was inappropriate. Id. at 320.
132 Id. at 318. "Title VII protects whites and men as well as blacks and women, but the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not protect the young as well as the old, or
even, we think, the younger againstthe older." Id. The court was primarily concerned with
the policy implications of permitting reverse discrimination. It argued that if "workers 40
or older but younger than the age of eligibility for early retirement could complain.., early
retirement plans would effectively be outlawed, and that was not the intent of the framers
of the [ADEA]." Id.
133 848 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1988).
134 Id. at 278. "[Tlhe act does not forbid treating older persons more generously than
others." Id.
135

Id. at 277-78.

136 Id. at 278. The language in Schuler on which the Hamilton court relied, cited in note
134 supra, was in the context of the First Circuit's critique of the plaintiff, Schuler, basing
his ADEA claim on the severance package. Id.
137 678 F. Supp. 1366 (N.D. Ind. 1988).
138 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227 (7th Cir. 1992). In Wehrly, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of defendant employer when a forty-two-year-old claimed that the
employer had discriminated against him when he was constructively discharged, denied a
request for special early retirement, and denied a promotion. 678 F. Supp. at 1377. Citing
Karlen, the Wehrly court concluded that the ADEA would place an unreasonable burden on
employers if a plaintiff were able to establish a prima facie case because he was too young,
rather than too old, for a benefit program. Id. at 1382-83.
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cases for the proposition that the ADEA does not protect younger
139
employees equally with older employees.
Next, the court briefly turned to § 631(a) of the ADEA, which
1 40
establishes the protected class of individuals age forty and older.
Contrasting reverse discrimination challenges permissible under Title
VII, the court concluded that if the ADEA were intended to protect
younger employees equally with older employees, there would be no
141
reason for denying protection to employees under age forty.
Finally, the Hamilton court placed a limiting construction on 29
C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) by narrowly interpreting Congress' purpose in
enacting the ADEA.142 The court acknowledged that both the text of the
ADEA and the EEOC regulation permitted claims for reverse
However, the court
discrimination within the protected class. 43
concluded that a reading of the regulation that allowed reverse
discrimination suits exceeded the scope of the ADEA. 144 The court then

139 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227. The court also rejected the plaintiff's comparison of age
discrimination to Title VII race and gender discrimination. Id. For a discussion of the
evolution of ADEA reverse discrimination law, see supra Part II.
140 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227. "The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to
individuals who are at least 40 years of age." 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000).
141 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227.
If the Act were really meant to prevent reverse age discrimination,
limiting the protected class to those 40 and above would make little
sense. To illustrate the point, imagine that only racial minorities and
women could bring suit under Title VII. If Title VII so limited the
plaintiff class, we would be unlikely to read that statute to prohibit
reverse discrimination, either.
Id.
142 Id. at 1227-28. For the content of regulation 1625.2(a), see supra text accompanying
note 67.
143 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227. The court stated:
[Tihe Equal Employment Opportunity Commission appears to take the
same view of the ADEA as Hamilton. ... Moreover, there is some
arguable support for this position in the statute itself. Phrases like
"because of such individual's age," "on the basis of such individual's
age," or "'because of his age" lend themselves to an interpretation that
prohibits use of age as a factor, period.
Id. at 1227-28.
144 Id. at 1228. "[T]o the extent that regulation 1625.2 can be read to authorize reverse age
discrimination suits, we think that it exceeds the scope of the statute." Id. The Hamilton
court found only two prior cases that had interpreted regulation 1625.2(a): La Montagne v.
Am. Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1984), and Miller v. Lyng, 660 F. Supp.
1375 (D.D.C. 1987). 966 F.2d at 1228. Both of these cases cited the regulation "for the
proposition that an older plaintiff may maintain a cause of action under the ADEA even if
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determined that within the context of the Congressional Statement of
Findings and Purpose in § 621 of the ADEA, which refers to "older
workers" and "older persons," the phrase "arbitrary age discrimination"
means Congress intended that "discriminating against older people on the
basis of their age is arbitrary." 145 Finally, the court suggested that,
although the language of the statute as written is overinclusive, it was
"unwilling to open the floodgates to attacks on every retirement plan
because Congress chose more graceful language." 146 By its interpretation
of the policy Congress intended to further through the ADEA, the
Hamilton court found that the ADEA conclusively prohibits reverse
147
discrimination suits.
B.

The Sixth Circuit

In Cline v. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., 148 the Sixth Circuit
held that, contrary to Hamilton, the ADEA allows reverse discrimination
claims brought by members of the protected class.149 In Cline, past and
present employees of General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. claimed that
a health benefits provision of a collective bargaining agreement
("CBA2") between General Dynamics and their union discriminated

his replacement is over 40." Id. The La Montagne court read the regulation to "merely
[clarify] the point that an employer is not insulated from liability for age discrimination
when he chooses among people in the protected class." 750 F.2d at 1411 n.4. The Miller
decision lends a bit more support to the Hamilton court's position. The Miller court said of
the regulation, "[It is now hornbook law that the ADEA covers 'discrimination based on
age between younger and older persons within the group protected by the Act.'" 660 F.
Supp. at 1378 n.2 (quoting 3 LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 98.53, at 21-46
(rev. ed. 1986)). However, the Miller court also indicated that the employee's replacement
must be a significantly younger worker. Id.
145 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228. The court postulated that "Congress was concerned that
older people were being cast aside on the basis of inaccurate stereotypes about their
abilities. The young ...cannot argue that they are similarly victimized." Id. The Sixth
Circuit specifically rejected this reading that the plaintiff must be both older than his
replacement and within the protected class. See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296
F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S.Ct. 1786 (2003); infra Part III.B.
146
The court suggested "because such individual is older" and "on the basis of such
individual's advancing age" as alternatives to the neutral language of § 621 and § 631(a).
Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228; see also supra notes 59, 140 (quoting §§ 621, 631).
147
Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228.
148
296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted 123 S.Ct. 1786 (2003).
149
Id. at 467. While the facts of Cline were clearly what courts traditionally considered a
"reverse discrimination" challenge, the Cline court expressly rejected this terminology. Id.
at 471. The court argued, "An action is either discriminatory or it is not discriminatory ....
By the plain language of the ADEA [plaintiffs] are the victims of 'age discrimination.' Id.
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against employees age forty to forty-nine. 50 Prior to CBA2, which went
in to effect July 1, 1997, the parties had operated under a collective
bargaining agreement ("CBAI") that provided full health benefits to
retired employees with thirty years of seniority. 151 Under CBA2, General
Dynamics no longer provided full health benefits to a retiree unless that
person was fifty years old or older on July 1, 1997.152
The plaintiff-employees, who were all between the ages of forty and
153
forty-nine on July 1, 1997, divided into three groups for the lawsuit.
The "Cline group" was comprised of current employees who were no
longer eligible for retirement health benefits under CBA2.5 4 The "Babb
group" included ten employees who retired prior to July 1, 1997, in order
to receive health benefits under CBA1.155 The third group, the "Diaz
group," consisted of three employees who retired after July 1, 1997,
thereby becoming ineligible for health benefits. 5 6 All groups alleged
that providing health benefits solely to employees over age fifty was
57
discrimination based on age.1
Characterizing the plaintiffs' complaint as one of reverse
discrimination, the district court dismissed the claims. 158 The court
relied on Hamilton, as well as Dittman v. General Motors Corp.- Delco
Chassis Division159 and Parker v. Wakelin' 60 for the proposition that reverse
discrimination is not permitted by the ADEA. 161 In Dittman, a group of
employees between ages forty and fifty challenged a retirement

Id. at 467-68. The plaintiffs also alleged that the health benefits provision violated the
Ohio Civil Rights Act. Id. In addition to these discrimination claims, the plaintiffs asked
the district court to "determine whether the Cline group had standing to sue and whether
their claims were ripe." Id. at 468.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. There were 183 members of this group. Id.
155
Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
15
Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 846,848 (N.D. Ohio 2000), rev'd,
296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003).
159 941 F. Supp. 284 (D. Conn. 1996), affd, 116 F.3d 465 (2d Cir. 1997); see also supra note
105 (citing cases decided on grounds other than directly on whether the ADEA allows
reverse discrimination).
160 882 F. Supp. 1131 (D. Me. 1995), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 123 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 1997).
161 Cline, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 848.
150
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2
provision that was only available to employees over age fifty. 16 The
district court based its holding on a conclusion that the retirement plan
was a bona fide employee benefits program. 163 However, in dicta the
court supported the Hamilton holding that the ADEA offers no remedy
for reverse discrimination.1M Likewise, a group of teachers between the
ages of forty and fifty challenged a pension benefit system that favored
teachers over age fifty in Parker.6s The Parker court found that the
plaintiffs lacked standing for a disparate impact challenge to a retirement
system. 166 Like the Dittman and Parkercourts, the Cline district court also
approved of the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of congressional intent
in Hamilton.167 Ultimately, the district court concluded that while "CBA2
'facially discriminates' by creating two classes of employees based solely
on age," the employees did not have a cause of action under the ADEA
for reverse discrimination. 168

The Sixth Circuit began its analysis of the district court's disposition
by interpreting the language of § 631 and § 623 of the ADEA. 169 In order
to ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the ADEA, the court applied the
principles of statutory interpretation: (1) legislative intent is determined
by the plain language of the statute; (2) if the statute is ambiguous, a
court turns to the legislative history to determine Congress' intent; and
(3) if the language provides a result that the court believes is inconsistent
with what Congress "must have" intended, the court's reading must
remain true to the language of the statute and may not attempt to correct
the problem. 170 Turning to the language of the ADEA, the Sixth Circuit
determined that the protection for individuals over age forty contained
in § 631, when read together with the prohibition on discrimination

162 941 F. Supp. at 286.
16 Id. at 286-87.
164 Id. at 287.
165 882 F. Supp. at 1140-41.
16 Id. at 1140. As in Dittman, the Parker court relied on Hamilton to support its holding.
Id. at 1140-41.
167 Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 846, 848 (N.D. Ohio 2000), rev'd,
296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003); see also supra notes 140-47
and accompanying text.
16 Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted,
123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003).
169 Id. at 468-70. For the text of § 631(a), see supranote 140. For the text of § 623(a)(1)-(2),
see supra note 47.
170 Cline, 296 F.3d at 469. The court noted that the "'primary rule of statutory
Id. (quoting
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent.'"
Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 215 F.3d 608, 616 (6th Cir. 2000)).
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against "any individual" in § 623, plainly indicates that "an employer
may not discriminate against any worker age forty or older on the basis
of age." 171
After rejecting the Hamilton court's interpretation of the appropriate
ADEA plaintiff, the Sixth Circuit criticized Hamilton on four additional
grounds.1 72 First, the court rejected Hamilton and its progeny as relying
too heavily on the generalized language of the Statement of Findings and
Purpose in § 621.173 Second, the court critiqued Hamilton on grounds that
it reversed the traditional rule of statutory interpretation that "the more
direct and specific language of a statute trumps the more generalized." 174
The Cline court agreed that the general purpose of the ADEA was to
protect "older workers," but argued that protecting any worker above
age forty was not inconsistent with this goal.175 Furthermore, the Cline
court found its interpretation to be consistent with that of the EEOC in
regulation 1625.2 and criticized the Hamilton court's failure to give the
agency deference. 176 Finally, the court rejected the Seventh Circuit's
musings on what that court had considered the "overinclusive" nature of
the statute's language. 7 The Cline court noted, "If Congress wanted to

171 Id. (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit then rejected the Hamilton interpretation of
the appropriate ADEA plaintiff, which had been adopted by the district court. Id. at 470.
The court observed that the Hamilton version would require the "any individual" language
in § 623 to be interpreted as "older workers," meaning only individuals who are both forty
years old and relatively older than their replacement. Id. The court said, "We think the
plain meaning of the statute will not bear that reading." Id.
172 Id. at 469-71.

173 Id. at 470. For the full text of the statement of findings and purpose, see supra note 59
and accompanying text.
174 Cline, 296 F.3d at 470.

175 Id. The court also reframed the question presented in a protected class reverse
discrimination context. Id. Rather than determining whether the ADEA prohibited
discrimination against "'older workers," the Sixth Circuit posited that the question is really
"whether any worker over the age of 40 ('any individual') may be discriminated against on
the basis of age." Id.
In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Cole observed that the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning, but not that of the Hamilton court, does not render § 623(l)(1)(A) meaningless.
Id. at 473 (Cole, J., concurring). Judge Cole observed, "Section 623(l)(1)(A) allows an
employer to set a minimum age as a condition for eligibility in a pension plan. If younger
protected employees could not sue their employers for the preferable pension treatment of
older employees, then the minimum age exception in [the section] would not be necessary
.... Id. (citation
.
omitted).
176 Id. at 471.
177 Id. at 471-72.
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limit the ADEA to protect only those workers who are relatively older, it
clearly had the power and acuity to do so. It did not." 178
In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Cole noted that permitting
reverse discrimination suits to go forward furthers two of the findings
that support the ADEA.17 9 First, Judge Cole argued that a fifty-year-old
person is equally disadvantaged when discriminated against in favor of
a younger person or in favor of an older person.180 Second, Judge Cole
claimed that reverse discrimination suits would reduce the burden on
commerce created by unemployed older individuals.181 As a final point,
Judge Cole rejected the notion that reverse discrimination suits were
absurd by noting that state discrimination laws are being interpreted to
182
allow reverse discrimination suits.
Judge Cole also reconciled the O'Connor "substantially younger" test
with the Cline holding. 183 Judge Cole distinguished the facts in O'Connor
from those at bar, noting that the Cline case was "a direct evidence age
discrimination case," so the prima facie test created by O'Connor did not
Nevertheless, Judge Cole observed that the
directly apply. 184
"substantially younger" test could have a significant impact on reverse
discrimination claims because it suggests that the ADEA does not permit
such claims.185 Judge Cole refuted this implication by arguing that the
Supreme Court was not considering a reverse discrimination case in
O'Connor.186 Secondly, the Supreme Court "acknowledged that members

178 Id. at 472.

179 Id. at 474-75 (Cole, J., concurring).
180 Id. "[A] fifty-year-old employee is equally disadvantaged in retaining and regaining
employment if he is age discriminated against in favor of a thirty-year-old as if he is age
discriminated against in favor of a sixty-year-old." Id. at 474. This argument addressed the
finding that "older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain
employment" found in § 621(a)(1). Id.
181 Id. at 474-75. "In another of its findings, Congress declared that 'the existence in
industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary discrimination in employment because of age,
burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce."' Id. at 474.
182 Id. "[C]ourts have already begun to interpret state discrimination laws as allowing
reverse age discrimination suits .. . . Thus, based on the congressional statements of
purpose and similar state-law provisions, it is not absurd to allow members of the
protected class to sue for reverse discrimination." Id. at 474-75.
Id. at 475-76.
183
184
185

Id. at 475.
Id.

186 Id. Cole also posited that "had the Supreme Court also considered the question of
reverse age discrimination[,] I believe it would have expressed the fourth part of the prima
facie test as requiring proof of 'substantial difference in age' as opposed to 'substantially
younger."' Id.
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within the protected class may sue one another." 187 Third, the Cline court
followed the same methodology that the Supreme Court used in
O'Connor to determine whether the statutory language would allow a
reverse age discrimination challenge. 188
In sum, rather than follow the policy arguments of the Seventh
Circuit in Hamilton,189 the Sixth Circuit looked directly to the text of the
ADEA to reach its decision that the ADEA provides a remedy to
plaintiffs under a reverse discrimination theory. 190 In order to evaluate
the merits of the Sixth and Seventh Circuit approaches, this Note next
turns to an independent analysis of the Act. 191

IV. THE ADEA PROTECTS MEMBERS OF THE PROTECTED CLASS FROM
REVERSE DISCRIMINATION

The key question in the reverse discrimination debate is whether the
ADEA only prohibits discrimination against those individuals over age
forty who are also disfavored in relation to younger workers, as the
Hamilton court suggests, or rather, as the Cline court posits, the Act
unequivocally prohibits discrimination based on age against any
individual over the age of forty. 9 2 When faced with such conflicting
interpretations of a statute's text, a court's responsibility is to determine
the legislature's intent.193 Tools of statutory interpretation, which direct
the inquiry towards the statute's language, structure, subject matter,
context, and history, guide the court to a greater understanding of the
statute's meaning. 94 The value of these canons of interpretation can be
debated.1 95 In addition, their use, which is susceptible to the

Id.
188 Id. Cole concluded, "[Allthough a close call, I do not believe that our result violates
Supreme Court precedent." Id. at 476.
'189 See supra text accompanying notes 129-47.
190 Cline, 296 F.3d at 467. Judge Williams dissented from the Cline majority, agreeing
with the district court that Hamilton gave the appropriate interpretation of the ADEA. Id. at
476-77. He also expressed concern over the majority opinion's impact on collective
bargaining agreements. Id. at 476. He said, "The majority's holding in this case potentially
could [call] into question the validity of seniority and early retirement programs contained
in collective bargaining agreements across the country. If such is allowed, bargaining for
all workers, regardless of age, would suffer." Id.
187

191
192
193

See infra Part IV.
See supra Part II.
See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998).

194

Id.

195 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.

Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001) ("Canons of
construction need not be conclusive and are often countered, of course, by some maxim
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jurisprudential position of the judges, may change slightly over time as
the court changes. 196 Nevertheless, these tools remain valuable as the
197
primary means to unearth legislative intent.
This Part applies contemporary federal court views of statutory
interpretation to the sections of the ADEA critical to the reverse
discrimination inquiry. 198 First, this Part looks to the statute itself,
examining (1) the plain meaning of the language contained in § 621 (the
statement of purpose), § 631 (limiting the protected class to those at least
age forty), and § 623 (the prohibitive mandate);199 (2) any contribution
the Act's legislative history brings to the question;200 and (3) the policy
arguments for and against allowing reverse discrimination suits by
members of the protected class. 201 Next, this Part considers whether
regulation 1625.2(a) appropriately stands within the scope of the
statute. 20 2 Finally, this Part concludes with a comparison of the forgoing
20 3
analysis to the Hamilton and Cline court decisions.
A. The Statutory Language, History, and Policy
1.

The Text

As the clearest indication of meaning, the text of the ADEA is the
starting point for statutory analysis.2°4 When the language of a statute is
unambiguous, a court does not need to look beyond it to determine

pointing in a different direction."); Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94
(2001).
196

See generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1999). For example, the Supreme Court found that legislative
history shows Congress did not intend a municipality to be a "person" for purposes of
recovering damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961).
However, the Court reversed itself on grounds that the same legislative history did support
a finding that a municipality is a person in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). For a criticism of traditional theories of statutory
interpretation, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas
PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990) (exploring existing theories of interpretation
and advocating a new "practical reasoning" approach).
197 Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 94.
198 See infra Part IV.A.
199

See infra Part IV.A.1.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
201 See infra Part IV.A.3.
202 See infra Part IV.B.
203 See infra Part IV.C.
204 See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127-28 (1998) ("We begin with the
200

statute's language.").
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legislative intent. 205 However, if two people could reasonably interpret
the statutory language to mean different things, the language is
20 6
ambiguous and the inquiry must continue into other textual aids.
Furthermore, in determining whether a statute is ambiguous, the
Supreme Court looks to the entire statute as a whole. 2 7 This "whole act"
approach incorporates the entire statutory text but does not prevent a
court from finding that some portions of the text have more authority to
override implications from other portions in question.208
Applying these principles to the text of the ADEA reveals that the
Act contains no significant ambiguity. 2 9 First, the prohibitive mandate
of § 623 is not by itself ambiguous. 210 This section clearly makes it
unlawful for any employer to discriminate against "any individual ...
because of such individual's age." 21' The plain meaning of the word
"individual" rejects any suggestion that the term is defined by
relationship to another individual, such as a younger or older person or
thing. 212 According to Webster's Third Dictionary, an individual is "a
213
single or particular being or thing or group of beings or things."
Section 623 contains no reference to older workers, older persons, or any
other language that would indicate a congressional intent to modify this
definition. 2 4 Furthermore, this section is not ambiguous when read in
215
conjunction with § 631, which establishes the Act's protected group.
Section 631 defines the "age limits" of the Act as confined to

205 United States v. Wells, 519 US. 482, 497 (1997) ("Absent a clearly expressed legislative
intention to the contrary, [statutory] language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.")
(quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
206

2A

NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 46.04, at 145-46 (6th ed., rev. vol. 2000).
207 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000). "A court
must ...interpret the statute 'as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme' and 'fit, if
possible, all parts into an harmonious whole."' Id. (citation omitted).
M8
See 2A SINGER, supranote 206, § 47.02, at 212.
209 See infra text accompanying notes 210-24.
210 See infra notes 211-17 and accompanying text. For the text of § 623(a)(1)-(2), see supra
note 47.
21
29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000).
212 See infra text accompanying note 213. When construing statutory language, a court
should interpret words according to their ordinary meaning. Crane v. Cornm'r of Internal
Revenue, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947) ("[Tlhe words of statutes ...should be interpreted where
possible in their ordinary, everyday senses.").
213 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1152 (3d ed. 1966).
214 See 29 U.S.C. § 623. The Act's definition of "employee" also refers to "individuals."
Id. § 630(f) ("The term 'employee' means an individual employed by any employer....").
215 See id. §§ 623, 631; see also supra text accompanying note 171.
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[individuals at least 40 years of age." 216 Consistent with § 631 and
§ 623, no other section in the Act's body refers to the workers protected
217
by the ADEA with terminology alternative to "individuals."
The references to "older workers" and "older persons" in the ADEA
Statement of Findings and Purpose, § 621, do not create ambiguity as
against the remainder of the statutory text. 218 The federal courts have
consistently held that the language of an act's preamble 219 is not
220
dominant to, or even equal with, the language in the body of the act.
Rather, a court may resort to using the preamble as an interpretive guide
only when the language of the statute has first proved ambiguous. 221
Because the mandate to protect any individual over the age of forty is
clear in the text of the ADEA, a court need not look to the Act's preamble
for guidance. 222 In addition, using the text of the Statement of Findings
and Purpose to create ambiguity would violate the principle that
statutory interpretation may not be used to create ambiguity where none
otherwise exists."' Finally, even if a court weighs § 621's promotion of

216 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
217 See id. §§ 621-634.
218 See infra notes 219-24 and accompanying text.
219 The Statement of Findings and Purpose in § 621 of the ADEA falls well within the
dictionary definition of a preamble: "the introductory part of a statute ... that states the
reasons and intent of the law.. . or is used for other explanatory purposes .... " WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1783 (3d ed. 1966).

220 See, e.g., Coosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina ex. rel. Tillman, 144 U.S. 550, 563 (1892)
(" [E]xpress provisions in the body of an act cannot be controlled or restrained by the title or
preamble."); Samuels v. District of Columbia, 650 F. Supp. 482, 484 (D.D.C. 1986) ("[Tlhe
preamble of the Housing Act is merely a general statement of policy which does not
mitigate and certainly does not override the specific requirements laid out in the body of
the statute.") (criticizing defendant's reliance on the preamble of the Fair Housing Act to
avoid liability).
221 Price v. Forrest, 173 U.S. 410, 427 (1899); Beard v. Rowan, 34 U.S. 301, 317 (1835) ("The
preamble in the act may be resorted to, to aid in the construction of the enacting clause,
when any ambiguity exists."). According to the Price court:
Although a preamble has been said to be a key to open the
understanding of a statute, we must not be understood as adjudging
that a statute, clear and unambiguous in its enacting parts, may be so
controlled by its preamble as to justify a construction plainly
inconsistent with the words used in the body of the statute. We mean
only to hold that the preamble may be referred to in order to assist in
ascertaining the intent and meaning of a statute fairly susceptible of
different constructions.
173 U.S. at 427.
222 See supra text accompanying notes 209-17.
m2 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 689 (2001) ("'[Tlhe fact that a statute can be
applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate
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opportunities for "older workers" against the "any individual" language
contained in the rest of the statute, the prohibition of discrimination
against "any individual" must prevail under the principle that the
224
specific language trumps the more general language.
The principal that no section of the ADEA should be rendered
superfluous by means of statutory interpretation further supports what
the clear language of the statute indicates: that an ADEA plaintiff only
needs to be over the age of forty. 22 5 Section 623(l)(1)(A) of the statute
allows an employer to set a minimum age for eligibility of retirement
benefits in connection with a pension plan. 226 If the legislature did not
contemplate the possibility of a younger member of the protected class
suing an employer because the employer treated older members more
favorably, this section would be unnecessary-the statute would not
227
need to contain a provision protecting employers from such suits.
Furthermore, Congress chose to use a scalpel, rather than an axe,
when it carved this age exemption, as well as the broader benefits and
seniority system exemptions found in § 623(f), in the 1990 Older Workers
228
Benefit Protection Act ("OWBPA") amendments to the ADEA.

ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth."') (citing Penn. Dept. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,
212 (1998)); Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519 (1923) ("Rules of
statutory construction ... have no place ... except in the domain of ambiguity. They may
not be used to create but only to remove doubt.") (citations omitted).
224 Townsend v. Little, 109 U.S. 504, 512 (1883); see also 3A NORMAN J. SINGER,
SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 74.09, at 395 (5th ed. 1992)

("When ...two different parts of the same statute appear to conflict, the court should first
examine the language to determine whether they may be reconciled.").
221 Freytag v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 877 (1991) ("Our cases
consistently have expressed 'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to
render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment.'") (quoting Penn. Dept. of Pub.
Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990)); see also Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys.,
Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 473 (6th Cir. 2002) (Cole, J., concurring), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786
(2003). For the text of Circuit Judge Cole's concurrence on this issue in Cline, see supra note
175.
226

Section 623 provides:

Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of subsection (f)(2)(B)

of this

section -

(1) It shall not be a violation of subsection (a), (b), (c), or (e) solely
because -

(A) an employee pension benefit plan ... provides for the attainment
of a minimum age as a condition of eligibility for normal or early
retirement benefits ....
29 U.S.C. § 623(l)(1)(A) (2000).
227 See Cline, 296 F.3d at 473.
228 See supra note 51.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 [2003], Art. 6

250

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.38

OWBPA was enacted after the decisions in Karlen and Schuler, the
principal cases on which the Hamilton court relied to conclude that the
ADEA barred reverse discrimination claims. 229 The plaintiffs' challenges
in both cases, an early retirement plan in Karlen and a voluntary
severance option in Schuler, were addressed in the OWBPA
amendments. 230 Had Congress chosen at that time to bar all ADEA
challenges by younger members of the protected class, it could have
done so. 231 Instead, Congress enacted several explicit exceptions to the
overall ban on age discrimination against employees over the age of
forty. 232 Any attempt to add to these explicit exceptions would abrogate
Congress' intent to prevent age discrimination in its many unique
forms.

233

In sum, Congress' intent to prohibit discrimination against any
individual over the age of forty is clear from the plain meaning of the
Act's text. 234 Allowing the generalized call to provide opportunities for
"older workers" found in the Statement of Findings and Purpose to limit
or muddy the statute's clear mandate would violate settled principles of
statutory interpretation, including the Supreme Court's instruction that
an act's preamble may only be used as a second source of guidance when
a statutory text is otherwise ambiguous. 235 Furthermore, reading the
statute to prohibit reverse discrimination claims by members of the
protected class would inappropriately render the pension benefit
exception in § 623(l)(1)(A) irrelevant. 236 Finally, following Karlen and
Schuler, Congress was on notice that younger members of the protected
class may use the ADEA to challenge employer programs that benefit

229 See supranotes 129-36 and accompanying text.
230 See Older Workers Benefit Prot. Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990). In the
Senate Report accompanying OWBPA, Congress approved of the Karlen holding. See S.
REP. No. 101-263, at 12, 14-15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1517, 1519-20
(stating that the Karlen court appropriately concluded that a reduction in early retirement
benefits must be closely correlated with cost and not based on age alone).
231 See Cline, 296 F.3d at 471-72. The Senate Report of OWBPA emphasized the broad
sweep of the ADEA and the very narrow circumstances in which the abridgment of its
prohibition on age discrimination is appropriate. See S. REP. No. 101-263, at 5-6, reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1510-11.
232 See 104 Stat. 978; supra note 231.
233 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S.
53, 58 (2000) ("When Congress provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow that
courts have authority to create others.").
234 See supra notes 204-33 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 209-24 and accompanying text.
236 See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
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older members. 237 Rather than restrict all access to the courts by these
plaintiffs, Congress chose to establish exceptions to protect employers in
specific situations. 238 In so acting, Congress deliberately preserved the
ADEA's general protection for all employees over the age of forty.239
2.

Legislative History

Although a court need not resort to the legislative history of a statute
when the text itself is clear, legislative history can provide insight into
the legislature's intended goals. 240 Legislative history is usually decisive
of the issue when it is available and supports the apparent meaning of
the text.241 However, a statute's legislative history will not be decisive
when it is contradictory to the plain meaning of the statutory
language.242 Despite the second-tier value of such history (as compared
to the statutory text), it can aid a court in determining how the
legislature would have responded "had it possessed the foresight to
243
anticipate what has happened since the statute's enactment."
At the very least, the legislative history of the ADEA provides little
insight into reverse discrimination challenges brought by older members
of the protected class. 244 At the most, the history is expansive enough to
tolerate such claims. 245 The House Report that accompanied the ADEA
speaks generally of a need to promote hiring free from age
discrimination 246 and reiterates the purpose of the Act as promoting "the
employment of older workers based on their ability" and prohibiting

237 See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
2M
See supranote 232 and accompanying text.
239 See supratext accompanying notes 237-38.
240 See 2A SINGER, supra note 206, § 45.02, at 15-16; see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note
196, at 357 (noting that legislative history has a "second-best status ...as an interpretive
guide").
241 See Eskridge and Frickey, supra note 196, at 356-57.
242 Id. at 357. As Eskridge and Frickey explain:
Unlike the statutory text, it was not enacted into law, and giving
conclusive effect to clear legislative history when statutory language is
ambiguous or vague is in tension with Article I requirements. It also
may threaten to promote rent-seeking by private interests ....Thus,
even crystal-clear legislative history will not always control
interpretation, and in any event other interpretive sources will be
considered.
Id.
243
Id.
244 See infra text accompanying notes 245-50.
245 See infra text accompanying notes 246-50.
246 See supranote 60.
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arbitrary age discrimination. 247 Both this report and the legislative
reports for the Act's later amendments raising the upper age limit of the
protected class focused on eliminating forced retirement of older
employees. 248 The expansive language of these reports, and their focus
on mandatory retirement, suggest that the legislature was primarily
concerned with the broad sweep of discrimination against older workers,
rather than the nuances of how violations may occur. 249 In fact, Congress
recognized that the variety of situations in which the ADEA may apply
necessitates a case-by-case approach to administration of the Act250o
Secretary Wirtz's report to Congress also speaks in broad terms,
251
although its language suggests a prioritization of the ADEA's aims.
His report proposes four actions for the legislature, beginning first with
ending arbitrary discrimination, followed by adjusting existing
discriminatory employment systems and creating new employment and
educational opportunities for older workers. 252 These statements only
confirm the breadth of legislative action taken by Congress in enacting
253
the ADEA and provide little commentary on reverse discrimination.
The most direct legislative statement applicable to the question of
254
reverse discrimination is that of Senator Javitz, a sponsor of the ADEA.
Javitz postulated that, "if two individuals ages 52 and 42 apply for the
same job and the employer selected the man age 42 ... because he is
younger than the man age 52, then he will have violated the act." 255
Statements of an act's sponsor are entitled to some deference when the
statement is consistent with the language and legislative history of the
act, although they are not binding. 25 6 However, isolated statements
contained in the legislative history are accorded very little weight,

See H.R. REP. No. 805, at 1 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2214; supra note
59 and accompanying text; see also S. REP. NO. 101-263, at 8 (1990) reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1513 (describing these aims as the "two critical purposes" behind the ADEA).
248
See supranotes 43-45 and accompanying text.
249
See supranotes 59-61 and accompanying text.
250 See supratext accompanying note 60.
251
See infra text accompanying notes 252-53.
252
See supra note 35 and accompanying text (listing Secretary Wirtz's recommended
actions).
253 See supranotes 35-39 and accompanying text.
254
See infra text accompanying notes 255-58.
25
Stephen E. Gruendel, Rejecting the Requirement that ADEA Plaintiffs Demonstrate
Replacementfrom Outside Protected Class: O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 38
B.C. L. REV. 381, 390 (1997).
256
See 2A SINGER, supra note 206, § 48.15, at 475-77.
247
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particularly as against the overall language of the statute.257 In any case,
regardless of the probative value of Senator Javitz's hypothetical, his
of the fifty-two-year-old
statement does not indicate whether preference
258
Act.
the
violate
also
would
age
his
of
because
Overall, the legislative history of the ADEA indicates that Congress
259
did not anticipate every peculiarity that might crop up under the Act.
Rather, Congress intended the ADEA to function as a broad prohibition
on age discrimination in the workplace, with certain narrowly tailored
exceptions. 260 While this broad aim accommodates claims of reverse
discrimination brought by members of the protected class, it provides no
directive on the issue. 261 For further guidance, this Note next considers
the policy arguments on both sides of the reverse discrimination
262
debate.
3.

Policy Considerations

In the context of civil rights legislation, courts will liberally construe
a statute's language so that its remedial objectives can be realized to their
fullest potential. 263 Under this inclusive approach, the prohibitions of
civil rights legislation extend beyond the primary evil targeted by a
statute to reach reasonably comparable evils. 264 In this manner, a court is

257 See NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 581-82 (1994); Garcia v.
United States, 469 U.S. 70, 78 (1984).
258 Cf.text accompanying note 67 (quoting the text of regulation 1625.2(a)). This question
is more directly addressed by EEOC regulation 1625.2(a), discussed infra Part IV.B.
259 See supra text accompanying notes 244-58.
260 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text; see also supra Part IV.A.I.
261 See supratext accompanying notes 244-58.
262 See infra Part [V.A.3; see also 2A SINGER, supra note 206, § 45:09, at 49. "Considerations
of what purpose legislation is supposed to accomplish are often mentioned as grounds for
the interpretation given to a statute." Id.
263 See 3A SINGER, supra note 224, § 74.05, at 374. "[Clourts favor broad and inclusive
application of statutory language by which the coverage of legislation to protect and
implement civil rights is defined." Id.; see Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523
U.S. 75 (1998) (liberally interpreting the Title VII prohibition against sex discrimination to
same-sex sexual harassment); H.R. REP. No. 805, at 1-2 (1967), reprinted in 1967
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2214 (describing the remedial purpose of the Act).
264 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80. In Oncale, a male employee was repeatedly harassed by his
male supervisors. Id. at 77. The Supreme Court held that "male-on-male sexual
harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned
with when it enacted Title VII .... Title VII prohibits 'discriminat[ion] ... because of...

sex' in the 'terms' or 'conditions' of employment. Our holding that this includes sexual
harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory
requirements." Id. at 79-80 (emphasis added).
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able to apply the corrective spirit of the legislation within a changing
265
social context.
Under the ADEA specifically, allowing reverse discrimination claims
brought by younger members of the protected class is the only way in
266
If
which to completely effectuate both remedial purposes of the Act.
the Act's purpose of promoting the employment of older workers
dominates its purpose of eliminating arbitrary age discrimination, the
latter cannot fully be realized. 267 For example, employee A is four years
younger than employee B, and both are over the age of forty. 268 A and B
are hired at the same time and so have equal seniority under their
employer's collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). 269 Their employer
then adds a tie-breaker provision to the CBA, which bases seniority
benefits on "earliest date of birth."270 Subsequently, A loses her job to B,
271
who was able to take the preferred position solely because B is older.
In this situation, if the ADEA only protects the older of A and B, then A
cannot challenge the tie-breaking provision, and arbitrary discrimination
based solely on age has occurred against a member of the class
272
specifically protected from such discrimination by the Act.

265 See 2A SINGER, supra note 206, § 45:09, at 52. "[Tihe words of a
regarded as embodying a delegation of authority to exercise responsible
in relating the statutory concept, spirit, purpose, or policy to changing
Id.
266 See infra text accompanying notes 267-74.
267 See infra notes 268-72 and accompanying text.
268 This example follows the fact pattern of Garrett, 1997 WL 574739
1997), affid, 1999 WL 909980 (E.E.O.C. Sept. 30, 1999).
269 Garrett, 1997 WL 574739, at *1.
270

Id.

271

Id.

statute should be
creative judgment
needs of society."

(E.E.O.C. Sept. 5,

272 In Garrett, the plaintiff filed an equal opportunity complaint with her employer, the
postal service. Id. at *1-2. The postal service's administrative judge concluded that the
CBA violated the ADEA when it used age as a tie-breaker, but the postal service rejected
these findings and concluded that no discrimination had occurred. Id. In reversing the
postal service, the EEOC administrative judge concluded that regulation 1625.2 applied
directly to this situation, and that the Commission's interpretation of the ADEA was
entitled to greater deference than the opinions of the Seventh Circuit in Hamilton. Id.
When the Union appealed out of concern that abrogation of the CBA provision would
disrupt employee assignments and working conditions nationwide, a subsequent EEOC
administrative judge concluded, "[Wie do not find that a violation of the ADEA should be
allowed to continue merely because of speculation that an adverse ruling could result in a
disruption of the assignments of [Rural Carrier Associates] and impact mail service in the
United States." 1999 WL 909980, at *3 (E.E.O.C. Sept. 30, 1999).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol38/iss1/6

Hartzler: Reverse Age Discrimination Under the Age Discrimination in Employ

2003]

Reverse Age Discrimination

255

Statutory interpretation must suppress the illegal activity, including
subtle inventions and evasions that enable the illegal activity to continue,
and advance the remedy of the statute. 273 If the ADEA is intended to
promote employment opportunities for all individuals aged at least forty
years, then the prohibition on arbitrary age discrimination serves to seal
the gaps left open by traditional age discrimination claims brought by
individuals passed over for their younger counterparts -even those
274
claims unanticipated by the legislature when enacting the ADEA.
Although public policy strongly weighs in support of protected-class
reverse discrimination suits, several arguments have been advanced
against allowing these claims. 275 The primary argument in the federal
courts is that the ADEA was never intended to advantage younger
individuals to the detriment of their older counterparts, regardless of the
younger person's age. 276 Allowing these claims would lead to results so
bizarre that the aim of the ADEA, to protect older employees, would be
severely thwarted. 277 Several courts have opined that the ADEA does
278
not require that all members of the protected class be treated equally.
The preamble of the Act also lends support to considering the relative
ages of the disadvantaged and replacement employees in ADEA
complaints by stating that "the incidence of unemployment ... is,
relative to the younger ages, high among older workers." 279 This
argument gains some force from the Supreme Court's O'Connordecision,
which concluded that in order to establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination, an ADEA plaintiff in a discriminatory treatment case
does not need to show replacement by someone outside the protected
class, but merely by someone "substantially younger." 280 In addition to
See 1A SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION § 31.6, at
727 (6th ed., rev. vol. 2002).
274 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
275 See infra text accompanying notes 276-83.
276 See, e.g., Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 476-77 (6th Cir. 2002)
(Williams, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003); Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc.,
966 F.2d 1226, 1227 (7th Cir. 1992); see also supra note 103 and accompanying text.
277 See Cline, 296 F.3d 466, 476-77 (Williams, J., dissenting); Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227; see
also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 594-95 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
188 (1994)). "[P]olicy considerations 'cannot override our interpretation of the text and
structure of the Act, except to the extent that they may help to show that adherence to the
text and structure would lead to a result "so bizarre" that Congress could not have
intended it.'" Id.
278
See supra notes 129-39 and accompanying text; see also supra note 104.
279 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(3) (2000). For a statement of the findings, see supra note 59.
280 See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
273
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this policy argument, courts confronted with reverse discrimination
claims have also been concerned with their impact on CBAs. 281 If the
ADEA can be used to invalidate seniority and early retirement
provisions in CBAs, freedom to contract could be hampered to the
detriment of all employees, regardless of age. 282 Many federal courts
have rejected reverse discrimination suits on the basis of these two broad
283
conclusions.
Yet despite their popularity, the arguments against allowing
protected-class reverse discrimination claims are not convincing. 284 First,
the CBA argument fails under the elementary contract law principle that
one cannot contract for that which is illegal. 285 As contracts between
employers and the unions representing the employees, CBAs cannot
contain age-based provisions that overreach the scope of permissible
activity under the ADEA. 286 The conclusion that the ADEA only protects
plaintiffs relatively older than their replacement requires greater
discussion.287

The opponents of reverse discrimination claims overstate their
detrimental impact on the employees who are older than the reverse
discrimination plaintiffs. 288 The ADEA already protects age-based
decisions in bona fide seniority systems and employee benefits plans and
specifically allows for employers to use age as a proxy for pension
benefits. 289 In addition, OWBPA, which created these exceptions,
explicitly states that the ADEA was intended to bar all age-based

281 See, e.g., Cline, 296 F.3d at 476-77 (Williams, J., dissenting); Garrett, 1999 WL 909980

(E.E.O.C. Sept. 30, 1999).
See Cline, 296 F.3d at 476-77 (Williams, J., dissenting).
283
See supranotes 104-06 and accompanying text.
284
See infra text accompanying notes 285-97.
See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 351 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir. 1965).
285
"It is ...ordinarily desirable that competent parties be protected in their rights to make
These rights are restricted by the
and enforce agreements between themselves.
transcendent rule that denies enforceability to a private contractual provision which would
require an unlawful act...." Id.
286
See Garrett, 1997 WL 574739 (E.E.O.C. Sept. 5, 1997), affd, 1999 WL 909980 (E.E.O.C.
Sept. 30, 1999). Cf.Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 904 (1989) (finding that female
employees did state a claim for relief when they alleged that a CBA provision was
discriminatory based on sex in violation of Title VII, but that their claim was time-barred),
superseded by statute on other grounds, Casteel v. Executive Bd. of Local 703 of the Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 272 F.3d 463,466 (7th Cir. 2001).
See infra text accompanying notes 288-97.
287
See infra text accompanying notes 289-91.
288
See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
289
282
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discrimination in all employee benefits except when reductions are
justified by significant cost considerations. 290 With OWBPA, Congress
made it clear that the ADEA does allow an employer to treat one group
within the protected class more favorably than another group, but only
291
when the distinction is not arbitrarily based on age alone.
Furthermore, the O'Connor decision does not foreclose reverse
discrimination claims. 292 In O'Connor, the Supreme Court emphasized
that proper analysis of an ADEA claim does not hinge on the relative age
293
differences between the advantaged and disadvantaged employees.
Rather, the critical inquiry is whether the disadvantaged employee lost
out because of his or her age.294 Turning to the specific facts of the case,
which involved the plaintiff's replacement by a younger person, the
Court concluded that replacement by a substantially younger person
was more probative evidence of discrimination than replacement by
someone outside the protected class or someone insignificantly
younger. 295 Under the Court's "because of age" test, the "substantially
younger" requirement does not prohibit younger plaintiffs from fighting
296
arbitrary age discrimination that advantages older individuals.
Rather, it resolves a disagreement in the lower federal courts over
whether a traditional (older) plaintiff's replacement must be outside the
protected class, and it provides a guideline for establishing a prima facie
297
case in those situations.
In conclusion, the ADEA is part of a body of civil rights legislation
that courts have consistently interpreted in a liberal manner in order to
fully actualize the legislature's remedial goals. 298 Excluding reverse
discrimination claims substantially impedes the twin purposes of the
Act-the prevention of arbitrary age discrimination and the promotion

See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 101, 104 Stat. 978, at
978 (1990). As a practical matter, the exception that allows for a reduction in benefits based
on cost considerations disfavors older members of the protected class and favors the
younger. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000). Conversely, younger members are disfavored by the
ADEA's approval of setting an eligibility age for pension benefits. See id. § 623(I)(1)(A).
291
See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
292
See infra text accompanying notes 293-97.
293 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
294 See supra text accompanying note 89.
295 See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
296 See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 474-76 (6th Cir. 2002) (Cole,
J., concurring), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003).
297 See supra notes 81, 90 and accompanying text.
298 See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
290
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of employment opportunities for older workers. 299 Because parties to a
contract cannot make illegal contracts, age-based provisions in CBAs that
are not excepted by the Act's seniority or benefits provisions can receive
no legal protection. 300 Finally, the O'Connor decision not only does not
foreclose, but lends support to, the permissibility of reverse
discrimination claims by focusing on whether the plaintiff was
Having weighed these policy
disadvantaged because of age. 30 1
considerations and having explored the legislative history of the ADEA
and the text of the statute itself, this Note next questions whether
302
regulation 1625.2(a) is consistent with the Act.
B.

Regulation 1625.2(a)

When an agency regulation purports to interpret an act's provisions,
303
statutory interpretation does not end with the language of the act.
Rather, a court must also determine whether the regulation complies
with the statute. 3°4 Administrative interpretations are usually given
great deference, particularly in the innovative forum of civil rights
legislation. 305 However, an agency's understanding of a statute will not
be entitled to deference if it exceeds the meaning that the statute can
bear. 306 The Supreme Court articulated a test to determine whether a
regulation goes beyond the scope of its statute in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
NRDC, Inc.30 7 First, a court asks "whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue." 30 8 If Congress has not explicitly
addressed the issue, the court must next ask whether the administrative
interpretation is reasonable. 30 9 Under this two-step analysis, EEOC

See supra notes 266-74 and accompanying text. As this Note argues, "older workers"
means all workers forty and older, rather than older in a comparative sense. See supra Parts
I.B, IV.A.1.
300
See supra notes 281-91 and accompanying text.
301 See supra text accompanying notes 292-97.
302 See infra Part IV.B.
303 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-48 (1984);
see also 1A SINGER, supranote 273, § 31.6, at 726.
304 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45.
305 See 3A SINGER, supra note 224, § 74.09, at 396.
306 MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229 (1994).
307 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
308 Id. at 842. If Congressional intent is clear by the unambiguous language of the statute,
then the second prong of the test need not be reached. Id. at 842-43.
309 Id. at 843-44. In determining reasonableness, a court may not impose its own
interpretation on the statute. Id. at 843. In addition, the court need not conclude that the
agency's interpretation is the only permissible one, or even the one that the court would
have reached. Id. at 843 n.11.
299
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regulation 1625.2(a), which requires an employer to make employment
decisions based on some factor other than age, clearly falls within the
310
ADEA statutory prohibition against discrimination.
The purview of the ADEA unambiguously states that age
311
discrimination against any individual over the age of forty is unlawful.
Under this broad mandate of protection, Congress impliedly addressed
the precise question of, and endorsed the viability of, protected class
reverse discrimination claims by making age forty the sole criterion for
individuals to be protected by the Act. 312 Regulation 1625.2(a) states this
implied authorization in more explicit terms by saying, "It is unlawful
...for an employer to discriminate in hiring or in any other way by
313
giving preference because of age between individuals 40 and over."
The regulation's ban on age-based distinctions between individuals is not
contrary to the Act's protection of any individual, but rather emphasizes
that the ADEA inquiry turns on the discriminatory motive of the
employer rather than on the court's opinion of the hardship caused by
disfavoring a particular plaintiff employee. 314 Read in this manner, the
315
regulation merely illustrates the prohibitions of the Act.
Even assuming that the references to "older workers" and "older
individuals" in the preamble of the ADEA create ambiguity against the
"any individual" language of the Act's body, regulation 1625.2(a) is still
a reasonable interpretation of the statute.316 A regulation is unreasonable
only when it is contrary to the statutory language or the policy choices

See infra text accompanying notes 311-24. Regulation 1625.2 reads in part:
It is unlawful ...for an employer to discriminate in hiring or in any
other way by giving preference because of age between individuals 40
and over. Thus, if two people apply for the same position, and one is
42 and the other 52, the employer may not lawfully turn down either
one on the basis of age, but must make such decision on the basis of
some other factor.
29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (2002).
311 See generally supra Part IVA.1.
312 See generally supra Part IV.A. According to the Chevron court, when legislative
delegation to an agency to interpret the breadth of a statute is implied, "a court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency." 467 U.S. at 844.
313 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a).
314 See generally supra Part IV.A.
315 See generally supra Part IV.A; supra text accompanying notes 310-14.
316 See infra text accompanying notes 317-24. For a discussion of whether the preamble
31

and purview of the statute create ambiguity when read together, see supra text
accompanying notes 218-24.
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indicated by the Act's legislative history. 317 As explained above, the
language of regulation 1625.2(a) does not run in opposition to the
language of the ADEA. 318 The ADEA legislative history also does not
clearly reject the EEOC's interpretation of the Act. 319 While several
courts have argued that Congress intended only to benefit employees
who were disfavored against relatively younger employees, neither the
legislative history nor the language of the statute suggest that this
preference continues into the protected class. 320 Rather, both indicate
that Congress intended to reduce arbitrary discrimination against older
workers. 321 Regulation 1625.2(a) effectuates this policy by making clear
that an age-based decision disfavoring any member of the protected class
is unlawful. 322 Consequently, the regulation satisfies both prongs of the
Chevron analysis. 323 This Note next applies the principles explored in
Part IV to the Sixth and Seventh Circuit split over reverse
324
discrimination.
C. Analysis of the Circuit Split
This section evaluates the merits of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits'
analyses of reverse discrimination under the ADEA. 325 First, this section
critiques the Seventh Circuit's policy-oriented analysis in Hamilton as a
product of faulty reasoning. 326 Next, this section considers the statutory
construction arguments of the Cline court and concludes that the Sixth
Circuit in Cline provides the stronger evaluation of protected-class
327
reverse discrimination under the Act.
1.

Seventh Circuit

In Hamilton, the Seventh Circuit reached the correct result, denying
the plaintiffs recovery, albeit via incorrect reasoning. 328 The early
317 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845; see also 1A SINGER, supranote 273, § 31.6, at 728-30; 3A SINGER,
supra note 224, § 74.09, at 396 (an administrative interpretation is usually given deference,
unless it is inconsistent with mandate of statute or would undermine policies of statute).
318 See supra text accompanying notes 303-15.
319 See supra Part IV.A.2.
320 See supraPart IV.A.1-2.
321 See supraPart IV.A.1-2.
322 See supra text accompanying note 286.
323 See supra text accompanying notes 303-22.
324 See infra Part IV.C.
325 See infra text accompanying notes 326-27.
326 See infra Part IV.C.1.
327 See infra Part IV.C.2.
328 See infra text accompanying notes 329-52.
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retirement program at issue allowed employees age fifty and older who
had also worked a certain number of years to collect benefits. 329 The
plaintiffs, ages forty to forty-nine, challenged the program as a violation
of the ADEA. 330 Aside from reversing the district court, the Seventh
Circuit had two alternative means of disposing of the case. 331 First, the
court could have affirmed the district court's decision that the early
retirement program was a bona fide benefit plan.33 2 Second, the court
could have entirely rejected the plaintiffs' reverse discrimination
argument on the grounds that the ADEA did not allow relief for victims
of reverse discrimination. 333 By jumping directly to the later of these two
theories without carefully considering the ADEA's language, history, or
policy, the Seventh Circuit neglected to conduct the careful analysis the
Act demands and attempted to create the type of generalized prohibition
334
that the statute's history explicitly rejects.
The Seventh Circuit did not err in its initial finding that the ADEA
does not always protect younger employees as well as it protects those
workers who are relatively older. 335 The ADEA allows preferential
treatment of relatively older employees in certain designated situations,
such as when an employer establishes a minimum age for pension
benefits.336 However, the Seventh Circuit did not reach its conclusion
337
through an analysis of the exceptions found in § 623 of the Act.
Rather, the court supported its conclusion on a policy assumption of the
court's creation that Congress could not have intended younger
members of the protected group to have a cause of action against an
employer who favors older members of the group.338 This basic
assumption runs contrary to the actual policy Congress was seeking to

See Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1227 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id.
331
See infra text accompanying notes 332-33.
332 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227. Several other courts have avoided addressing the validity
of reverse age discrimination by utilizing the exceptions in the Act, such as the bona fide
benefit plan exception. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. For a summary of the
exceptions in the Act, see supra text accompanying notes 50-52 and notes 226-27 and
accompanying text.
333 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228. The court chose this approach. Id.
334 See infra text accompanying notes 33548.
335
Cf. supra notes 226-33 and accompanying text. Within § 623, Congress established
several exceptions that permit employers to preference relatively older members of the
protected group. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
336 See supra note 335.
337 See Hamilton, 966 F.2d 1226.
338 Id. at 1227-28.
329
330
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implement with the ADEA:
the elimination of arbitrary age
discrimination that obstructs the ability of workers age forty and older to
339
find and retain gainful employment.
In an attempt to be consistent with its narrow interpretation of the
ADEA's policy goals, the Seventh Circuit further erred by placing a
limiting construction on the EEOC regulation interpreting the Act and on
the text of the ADEA itself. 340 The textual language of the statute
unequivocally rejects discrimination against any individual over age
forty because of age.341 Yet the court ignores principles of statutory
interpretation by placing undue emphasis on the references to "older
workers" and "older persons" in the ADEA preamble to limit the Act's
prohibitive mandate to reach only arbitrary discrimination against
relatively older individuals. 342 The court's finding that regulation
1625.2(a) exceeds the scope of the ADEA when applied in favor of a
relatively younger plaintiff naturally follows from such a stifled reading
343
of the statute.
In enacting the ADEA, Congress recognized that age discrimination
claims must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis because of the many
ways in which discrimination can occur.344
With the OWBPA
amendments to the Act, Congress designated specific circumstances in
which employers can make age-based decisions. 345 Congress also
emphasized the narrowness of these exceptions. 346 In Hamilton, the
Seventh Circuit sidesteps Congress' case-by-case instruction in favor of a
roughly drawn prohibition on reverse discrimination claims that looks
not at the motivation of the employer, but on the relative ages of the
advantaged and disadvantaged workers. 347 In so doing, the Seventh

339 See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 473-75 (6th Cir. 2002) (Cole,
J.,
concurring), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003). As a practical matter, a fifty-year-old
may have equal difficulty as a fifty-five-year-old in finding employment. Id. at 474. For a
discussion of how including reverse discrimination claims can best effectuate the purposes
of the ADEA, see supra Part IV.A.3.
W4
See infra notes 341-48 and accompanying text.
341 See supra Part IVAJ.
342 See Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227.
The court reaches this conclusion even as it
acknowledges that the language of the statute supports reverse discrimination claims. Id.
at 1228.
343 Id.at 1227-28.
344 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
345 See supra notes 51, 228-33 and accompanying text.
346 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
347 See Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227-28; see also supra note 175 (quoting the Cline court's
analysis of the statutory reading resulting from the Hamilton opinion).
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Circuit mischaracterizes the ADEA prohibition against age-based
decisions.348
Despite the Seventh Circuit's faulty reasoning, the court's refusal to
grant the plaintiffs relief was still a correct result. 349 The early retirement
program did not tie benefits solely to age, but rather granted benefits
based on a combination of years of employment plus age. 350 As such, the
district court found the program to be a bona fide employee benefit plan
covered by § 623(f)(2) of the Act. 351 The Seventh Circuit did not need to
go beyond the § 623(f)(2) exception to conclude that the reverse
352
discrimination claim of the Hamilton plaintiffs must fail.
2. Sixth Circuit
Whereas the early retirement program at issue in Hamilton combined
age and years worked to determine benefits, the CBA provision facing
the Sixth Circuit in Cline awarded benefits based on age alone. 35 3 Yet
rather than considering whether this age-based provision can be upheld
under any of the exceptions found in the ADEA § 623, the Sixth Circuit's
Cline opinion focuses primarily on whether the Act allows reverse
Although the court's analysis lacks
discrimination in general. 354
consideration of the ADEA exceptions, the majority and concurring
opinions in Cline provide a nearly complete summary of the steps a court
should take to analyze a reverse discrimination challenge under the
355
ADEA.
The Sixth Circuit appropriately looked to the language of the ADEA
356
itself to determine whether the Act supports reverse discrimination.
The court first utilized tools of statutory interpretation to evaluate the
scope of and reconcile any potential inconsistencies in the Act's

W'8 Compare the result illustrated in note 175 supra, with the analysis in Part IV.A.1 supra.
See infra notes 350-52 and accompanying text.
350 See Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227.
349

351

Id.

352

See supra text accompanying notes 350-51; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A

TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Minimalism is the concept that
a court should decide the case before it on the narrowest grounds. SUNSTEIN, supra, at ix-x.

A majority of the Justices on the current Supreme Court support minimalism. Id. at xi-xiii.
353 See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003).
354 See id. at 467-72.
355 See infra text accompanying notes 356-64.
356 See infra text accompanying notes 357-59; supra Part IV.A.
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language. 357 Rather than forcing the language to reflect court policy, the
Sixth Circuit's finding that the text unambiguously prohibited
discrimination against any individual over the age of forty ultimately
came from a resolution of the pertinent sections of the statute with the
language of the Act's preamble. 358 This reading of the language is
consistent with the text of regulation 1625.2(a) and required no limiting
construction of the regulation such as that established by the Seventh
Circuit. 359
The concurrence of Judge Cole supplements the majority opinion by
360
placing it within the context of the policy effectuated by the Act.
Judge Cole's opinion acknowledges the dual purposes of the ADEA and
illustrates how preventing arbitrary discrimination could only be
realized through enabling any plaintiff within the protected group to
challenge an age-based decision. 361 Judge Cole's concurrence also
provides an essential explanation of the role of the Supreme Court's
362
O'Connorholding to reverse discrimination claims.
Between Cole's consideration of policy and Supreme Court
precedent, and the majority's analysis of the ADEA's text, the Sixth
Circuit creates a harmonious interpretation of the ADEA that stays true
to the remedial spirit of the statute. 363 This approach to the ADEA lays
the foundation for the development of model judicial reasoning for
courts faced with a fact pattern involving reverse age discrimination
3 64
within the protected class.
V.

EFFECTUATING THE REMEDIAL

PURPOSES

OF THE

ADEA

This Note illustrates that reverse discrimination should pose no
365
obstacle to a plaintiff challenging workplace age discrimination.
Nevertheless, the ADEA's general accommodation of reverse

357

See Cline, 296 F.3d at 468-72.

358

Id.

359 Compare id. at 471, with Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1227-28 (7th Cir.
1992).
W See Cline, 296 F.3d at 472-77 (Cole, J., concurring).
361 Id. at 472-75. Judge Cole illustrates how 29 U.S.C. § 623(l)(1)(A) would be rendered
useless by the Hamilton interpretation of the Act. Id. at 473; see also notes 225-27 and
accompanying text.
362 See Cline, 296 F.3d at 475-76 (Cole, J., concurring).
363 See supra text accompanying notes 356-62, Part IV.A.3.
364 See infra Part V.
365

See supra Part IV.
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discrimination as a theory of recovery does not excuse a court from
considering reverse discrimination claims under the same careful,
individualized analysis Congress requires for all ADEA claims. 366 A
more methodological approach to reverse discrimination claims than
that displayed by the Seventh Circuit in Hamilton would protect
employers from meritless complaints while enabling true victims of age367
based discrimination to obtain relief.
When faced with a scenario that suggests reverse age discrimination
within the protected class, a court should first consider whether the
employer action at issue is based on age alone. 368 If so, the court should
next consider whether the employer's action fits within any of the
exceptions outlined in § 623.369 As courts' current reliance on these
exceptions indicates, § 623 already provides a functional filter for the
370
great majority of employer actions that have an age-based component.
Only if the action has no other justification beyond the exceptions within
the statute should the court grant relief to a reverse discrimination
plaintiff.371 With this careful method of review, the judicial system will

366 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
367 See infra text accompanying notes 368-72.
368 For an example of this analysis, see supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text. The
courts are in disagreement as to whether the ADEA also acknowledges disparate impact as
a basis of recovery. See supra note 74.
369 See supra notes 50-52, 226 and accompanying text. A discussion of the factors guiding
a determination of whether an employer's age-based action meets one of the ADEA
exceptions is beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 124 (1985) (finding that a transfer system that discriminated based
on age was not a bona fide seniority system and discussing the bona fide occupational
qualification exception); Raskin v. The Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 61-62 (2d. Cir. 1997) (finding
a bona fide employee benefits program); Hiatt v. United Transp. Union, 65 F.3d 838, 84243
(10th Cir. 1995) (finding a system that treats workers equally and awards work based on
length of service is a bona fide seniority system); Henn v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d
824, 826-27 (7th Cir. 1987) (providing examples of bona fide seniority systems); Tracy Karen
Finkelstein, Note, Judicial and Administrative Interpretations of the Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification as Applied to the Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 217
(1992); James Lockhart, Annotation, "Bona Fide Seniority System" Exception to General
Prohibitionof Age Discrimination in Employment (29 U.S.C.A. § 6230(2)(A)), 177 A.L.R. FED.
415 (2002); James Lockhart, Annotation, "Bona Fide Employee Benefit Plan" Exception to
General Prohibition of Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 6230(2)(B)) as
Applied to Early Retirement Incentive Plans," 176 A.L.R. FED. 115 (2002).
370 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
371 See supra note 51 (discussing the OWBPA amendments as Congress' statement that
virtually all forms of employment discrimination violate the ADEA). With OWBPA,
Congress emphasized the narrow grounds on which an age-discriminatory action might be
upheld. See supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
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achieve an appropriate balance between respecting employer freedom
372
and promoting the remedial purposes of the Act.
VI. CONCLUSION

The ADEA is a remedial statute written to protect all individuals
over age forty from discrimination in the workplace on the basis of
age. 373 Allowing plaintiffs within the Act's protected group to recover
under a theory of reverse discrimination is not counterintuitive to this
goal. Rather, reverse age discrimination claims perform the essential
function of ensuring that all workers protected by the ADEA, and not
just those workers who are relatively older than the favored individual
or group, have recourse from unlawful age-based employment
systems. 374 Only through acceptance of reverse discrimination as a
theory of recovery and careful analysis of each claim can courts truly
protect individuals over age forty from the arbitrary discrimination that
375
inspired Congress to enact the ADEA.
Kelly J. Hartzler

372

373
374
375

See generally supra Part IV.
See supra Part II.A-B.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Parts I.A., IV.
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